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C O N T E N T S
 “Theoretical,” “out of touch,” “impractical.” 
Critics often use these words to describe  
legal scholarship. 
Chief Justice John Roberts reportedly asserts that he seldom reads or relies on law 
review articles. “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is 
likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches 
in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the 
academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.” 1 
The pieces in this issue of Fordham Law’s Faculty Spotlight 
Journal challenge those critics and show that scholarship 
by our faculty—doctrinal, interdisciplinary, theoretical, and 
every combination thereof—does influence the law and 
has an impact on the real world. We stress how lawyers 
can use their skills of critical analysis to become thoughtful 
leaders in the law who question the status quo and make 
a difference. The work of our faculty contributes to that 
culture at Fordham Law.
Rebecca Kysar identifies a new category of legislation that Congress could 
use to overcome inertia. Joseph Landau discusses a number of process-based 
mechanisms to surface the intent behind facially neutral government action. 
Research by Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Lieb, and Jed Shugerman shows that clauses 
in the U.S. Constitution relating to “faithful execution” do not support imperial 
conceptions of the presidency and instead are connected to a history of limited 
executive power. Robin A. Lenhardt focuses critical attention on the role family  
law systems and structures have long played in shaping racial subordination  
and disadvantage in the United States.
The content of this journal represents a small sample of our faculty’s work. Please 
visit our website to learn more about the work of all of our professors as well as our 
renowned student-edited journals, which are among the most cited in the country.
Please enjoy this issue of the Faculty Spotlight Journal and see for yourself how 
Fordham Law scholarship is making an impact throughout the legal profession  
and beyond.
Matthew Diller
Dean and Paul Fuller Professor of Law 
F O R E W O R D
1 Adam Liptak, (quoting Chief Justice Roberts’s remarks at a judicial conference).
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T he U.S. Constitution twice imposes  a command of faithful execution  on the President: The President must  
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed” and must swear or affirm that he 
or she will “faithfully execute the Office.” 
Until now, no research illuminated 
where the concept of “faithful execution” 
came from or what it meant when the 
Constitution was written and adopted. 
Original research by Andrew Kent, Ethan J. 
Leib, and Jed Shugerman shows that these 
clauses do not support imperial conceptions 
of the presidency and instead are connected  
to a history of limited executive power.
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Professor of Law 
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Professor of Law
In an article recently published in the Harvard Law Review, Professors Kent, Leib, and Shugerman discovered a history of faithful execution requirements stretching back at least to the Magna Carta. One of the first things the U.S. states and the new 
central government did after independence in 1776 was impose these requirements 
on their officials. Mining this historical record reveals a much fuller picture about the 
meaning of our Constitution’s Faithful Execution Clauses. The historical record supports 
a conception of the clauses and hence the presidency that is fiduciary in nature: The 
President must execute the office and the laws diligently and honestly; must carefully 
stay within authorizations from the Constitution and the Congress; and must act only 
in the public interest and never solely from self-interested or corrupt motives. Many 
scholars, presidents, and jurists have relied on the clauses to support expansive, almost 
monarchical, conceptions of the presidency, but the clauses are in fact connected to a 
history of limited executive power. 
As the article elaborates:
• The presidential oath looks quite different from the British monarch’s coronation 
oaths.
• Instead, the president’s oath parrots oaths for executive officials in mid-level and 
lower offices—officials who would have had mainly ministerial duties to carry out the 
standing law and no inherent prerogative to depart from it. 
• As it became less acceptable over time to use one’s office to extract private profits, 
faithful execution requirements became a mechanism to ensure officers did not 
engage in financial self-dealing. 
• The oath and command of faithful execution rehabilitate a republican conception 
of the presidency against some recent historical work that urges a more monarchical 
understanding of the office.
• A president’s choice not to enforce congressional laws because he or she dislikes 
Congress’s policies runs afoul of the Constitution’s command of faithful execution; 
this has implications for recent controversies about presidents failing to carry out 
Congress’s laws, such as the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, or 
immigration statutes. 
The article was awarded the American Constitution Society’s 2019 Richard D. Cudahy 
Writing Award at a ceremony in Washington, D.C., in June of 2019.
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INTRODUCTION 
he faithfulness of a President to the Constitution, the laws, and the 
ideals and traditions of the United States is at issue as never before.  
The American people today are confronted with questions that go to the 
foundations of our constitutional system as a “government of laws, and 
not of men”1 (or women).  Presidential powers previously understood as 
plenary are being used in ways that many see as destructive of consti-
tutional principles and norms.  May a President fire senior law enforce-
ment personnel, if the purpose is to protect himself or close associates 
from a criminal investigation?  May a President use the pardon power 
or his control over classification and declassification of information for 
the same purposes?  Does the Constitution have a plan for when it ap-
pears that a President may be motivated not by a view of the public 
good but by self-regarding or bad faith purposes? 
We think that two frequently cited but poorly understood parts of the 
Constitution speak to these questions.  Article II of the U.S. Constitution 
twice imposes a duty of faithful execution on the President, who must 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”2 and take an oath or 
affirmation to “faithfully execute the Office of President.”3  Although 
other public servants are “bound by Oath or Affirmation[] to support 
[the] Constitution,”4 no other officeholder has the same constitutional 
command of fidelity.  And the language of faith appears nowhere else in 
the document, save the requirement that “Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings 
of every other State.”5 
The two clauses requiring faithful execution look somewhat different 
from each other.  One is a straightforward legal command — albeit us-
ing the passive voice — imposing a duty throughout tenure in office 
with respect to the laws.  The other requires a promissory oath or affir-
mation with respect to the office, a single-occasion speech act with, in 
Anglo-American culture, a heavily religious flavor, notwithstanding the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  The phrase is older.  See, e.g., JOHN 
ADAMS, NOVANGLUS; OR, A HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE WITH AMERICA, FROM ITS ORIGIN, IN 
1754, TO THE PRESENT TIME, NO. VII (1775), reprinted in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS 
OF JOHN ADAMS 220, 226 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000) [hereinafter ADAMS WRITINGS]  
(“Aristotle, Livy, and Harrington . . . define a republic to be a government of laws, and not of men.”). 
 2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 3 Id. § 1.  We are not the first to note that these two clauses share the element of faithful exe-
cution.  See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1753, 1771–72 (2016); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 261 (1994); David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 907–08 (2016); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to 
Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1629–30 (2008). 
 4 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 5 Id. art. IV, § 1. 
T
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 5 Id. ar . IV, § 1. 
T
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Constitution’s command that “no religious Test shall ever be required 
as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States.”6  Edward Coke, the seventeenth-century jurist revered by many 
American framers,7 wrote that an oath necessarily involves “calling  
Almighty God to witnesse.”8 
Ov r the centuries, the two Faithful Execution C uses have pro-
duced wide-ranging jurisprudences and have been marshaled in many 
constitutional debates.  The President’s oath, often in combination with 
the so-called Take Care Clause, is invoked by participants in debates 
about t e power of the President not to enforce r defe d co gressional
laws on the ground of unconstitutionality.9  Both clauses have been cited 
by the executive branch as supporting an executive privilege to withhold 
internal documents10 and an authority to go beyond or even defy stand-
ing law to protect the nation in emergencies.11  The Supreme Court has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 6 Id. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 7 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
30–31, 177, 225 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776–1787, at 138–43 (1969). 
 8 EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
164 (London, 1797) (1644).  For an expression of this view by a prominent American lawyer at the 
Founding, see James Iredell, Address to the North Carolina Convention (July 30, 1788), in 4 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 192, 196 (Jonathan Elliott ed., Washington, D.C., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOTT].  
At the time the Constitution was written, the affirmation option was not viewed as an accommo-
dation for atheists or non-Christians — it was for most Americans unthinkable that such persons 
would hold public office.  See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY & LIBERTY: STATE 
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 47–49, 96–97 (1997) (discussing reli-
gious qualifications on officeholding in American states during the Founding era).  Rather, the af-
firmation was an accommodation for Christians who belonged to Protestant sects (non-Anglican) 
that viewed oath-swearing as profane.  See infra p. 2124.  The No Religious Test Clause of the 
Constitution was understood to prohibit the kind of provisions found in Great Britain and some 
American states that required an oath or affirmation of orthodox Protestant Christian belief as a 
condition of holding office.  See Note, An Originalist Analysis of the No Religious Test Clause, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1649, 1650–52 (2007). 
 9 See, e.g., Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 
16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 31–33 (1992); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 178–79 (2005); 
Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal Pre-
rogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 873–74 (1994); Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive De-
fense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1195–96 (2012); Paulsen, supra note 3, at 261–62; 
Prakash, supra note 3. 
 10 See, e.g., Constitutionality of the OLC Reporting Act of 2008, 32 Op. O.L.C. 14, 16–17 (2008); 
Response to Cong. Requests for Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under the Indep. Counsel Act, 10 
Op. O.L.C. 68, 79 (1986). 
 11 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 2–4, 27–28, 98–100, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579 (1952) (No. 745); First Inaugural Address — First Edition and Revisions (Mar. 4, 
1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 249, 253 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); 
see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 
1257–58 (2004) (locating in the Presidential Oath Clause and constitutional structure “an overriding 
principle of constitutional and national self-preservation . . . that may even, in cases of extraordi-
nary necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements”). 
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agreed with the less aggressive proposition that the Take Care Clause, 
together with other parts of Article II, conveys a large measure of au-
thority to defend the government and interests of the United States in 
the absence of standing law.12 
The Take Care Clause is also part of the justifications for, among 
other things, the President’s unfettered ability to remove the heads of at 
least some types of executive agencies;13 federal courts’ strict require-
ment of Article III standing, limiting Congress’s ability to grant broad 
citizen standing;14 and presidentially imposed oversight of agency rule-
making, such as mandatory cost-benefit analysis.15  Proponents of pros-
ecutorial discretion as within the province of the Executive invoke the 
Take Care Clause,16 as do participants in related debates about policy-
based nonenforcement or suspension of statutes,17 and presidential  
impoundment of appropriated funds.18  Most concede that the clause’s 
imposition of a duty to execute law implies that the President cannot 
make law,19 but some argue that it allows presidential “completion” of 
incomplete statutory regimes.20 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890). 
 13 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010); 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926); see also Suspension of Officer, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 
318, 319 (1885) (citing the Presidential Oath Clause as well). 
 14 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
761 (1984); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 36 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE 
L.J. 2280, 2295–96 (2006) (discussing Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1981), and Executive 
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993)). 
 16 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 832 (1985); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 17 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134, 
146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.) (per curiam) 
(presidential authority for a deferred action immigration program); SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE 
PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EX-
ECUTIVE 92–97 (2015) (exploring whether the “Faithful Execution Clause” was written to bar sus-
pensions and dispensations); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS 124 (2007) (suggesting that the Take Care Clause bars the suspension power claimed by 
English monarchs); Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. 
REV. 781, 784 (2013) (arguing “that the Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the President 
a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases. In other 
words . . . there is simply no general presidential nonenforcement power”); Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1878 (2015) (arguing that “the [Take Care] 
Clause at least embodies the principle that the President must obey constitutional laws and lacks a 
general prerogative or suspension power”); cf. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. 
Supp. 3d 53, 70 (D.D.C. 2015) (addressing whether “the Executive was unfaithful” to the ACA). 
 18 See, e.g., Neil M. Soltman, Recent Development, The Limits of Executive Power: Impound-
ment of Funds, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 359, 366–67 (1973). 
 19 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
 20 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 15, at 2303–04. 
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And in recent shorter works, we have suggested that the Take Care 
Clause and Presidential Oath Clause also speak to contemporary con-
troversies about President Trump’s use of the pardon power21 and his 
control over removal of officers in the Department of Justice.22  
Notwithstanding all of these claims about the clauses by the Executive, 
courts, and scholars, no one has actually figured out where the clauses 
came from or what they were understood to mean when they were 
drafted and adopted.23  Writing about the Take Care Clause, but mak-
ing a point that applies to the Presidential Oath Clause as well, Professors 
John Manning and Jack Goldsmith note that the Supreme Court tends 
to “treat[] the meaning . . . as obvious when it is anything but that,” and 
fails to “parse the text” or “examine the clause’s historical provenance.”24  
Little was said explicitly during the Philadelphia  
Convention or the ratification debates in the states about the Faithful 
Execution Clauses,25 but some scholars have noted that the Take Care 
Clause mirrors language found in the post-independence constitutions 
of Vermont, New York, and Pennsylvania, and a frame of government 
for colonial Pennsylvania.26  Still, essentially nothing has yet been dis-
covered or written about the origin and historical meaning of the “faith-
ful execution” language they share. 
This Article, then, is the first substantial effort to pursue the histor-
ical origins of the twin commands of faithful execution27 and to link 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 See Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Two Legal 
Conclusions, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11–13) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library); Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib & Jed Shugerman, Self-Pardons, Consti-
tutional History, and Article II, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 16, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/ 
self-pardons-constitutional-history-and-article-ii [https://perma.cc/SR2S-UTX7]; Jed Shugerman & 
Ethan J. Leib, This Overlooked Part of the Constitution Could Stop Trump from Abusing His Par-
don Power, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2018), http://wapo.st/2pdoIzK [https:// perma.cc/48ZB-YSPE].  
 22 Ethan J. Leib & Jed Shugerman, Mueller’s Recourse, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/if-a-trump-official-fires-the-special-counsel-to-protect-
trump-mueller-can-sue-to-keep-his-job.html [https://perma.cc/2C66-WG6H]. 
 23 See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1835, 1836 & n.9 (2016). 
 24 Id. at 1838. 
 25 See infra sections I.A–B, pp. 2121–32; see also MATTHEW A. PAULEY, I DO SOLEMNLY 
SWEAR: THE PRESIDENT’S CONSTITUTIONAL OATH 107 (1999) (“The wording of [the] oath 
occasioned little serious discussion during the Constitutional Convention.”); Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63 (1994) (“[A]t the 
founding, the [Take Care Clause] received relatively little consideration by practically everyone in 
the debate.”). 
 26 See infra notes 297, 374 & 377–378 and accompanying text; see also PRAKASH, supra note 
17, at 96 (noting the linguistic similarities); Bellia, supra note 3, at 1174 n.118 (same); Delahunty & 
Yoo, supra note 17, at 802–03 (same); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive 
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 693 n.75 (2014) (same). 
 27 But see Ryan S. Killian, Faithfully Interpreting “Faithfully” (Feb. 17, 2014) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (concluding in a short essay drawing upon 
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these findings to the original meaning of Article II.28  We do not enter 
the debates about how heavily originalist findings should ultimately 
weigh in the calculus of contemporary constitutional meaning, or about 
the best form of originalism.  We are satisfied that our archaeological 
project here is justified by the fact that all, or nearly all, constitutional in-
terpreters consider original textual meaning, informed by historical con-
text, to be an important factor in constitutional interpretation,29 and that 
all, or nearly all, varieties of originalists will find our methods reasonable.30 
So what does our new history show?  The Faithful Execution Clauses 
are linked not only by common words, but also by a common historical 
purpose: to limit the discretion of public officials.  The language of 
“faithful execution” at the time of the framing was very commonly as-
sociated with the performance of public and private offices — especially 
but by no means only those in which the officer had some control over 
the public fisc.  The drafters at Philadelphia did not ex nihilo come up 
with the idea of having a chief magistrate who would take an oath of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
contemporaneous usage that “faithful execution” was a “boilerplate term of art,” id. at 10, but also 
an example of the “‘anti-corruption principle’ animating the Constitution,” id. at 12). 
 28 A search for original public meaning of the Constitution’s text is currently the most widely 
accepted form of originalist inquiry.  This method is sometimes also called “new originalism,” “new 
textualism,” or other names.  It seeks to discern, as of the time of ratification of the constitutional 
text, “the meaning actually communicated to the public by the words on the page.”  Randy E. 
Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411, 413 (2013); see also 
Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
757, 759 (2013) (stating that new originalism seeks to find “the objective linguistic meaning that the 
text of the Constitution would likely have had to an American audience at the time of adoption”). 
 29 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
7–8 (1982); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The 
Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1798–800 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Construc-
tivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244–45, 1252–
58 (1987). 
 30 Because we present overwhelming evidence that the Faithful Execution Clauses were written 
in the language of the law, but see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution 
and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1321, 1371 n.229 (2018) (finding the Take 
Care Clause to be ambiguous rather than purely in the language of the law), “original methods” 
originalists will be able to interpret the clauses as lawyers at the time of the Founding would have 
understood their technical meanings.  See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Origi-
nal Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 751, 751–52 (2009).  Moreover, because we show that the concept of faithful execu-
tion of office was so commonly used and well known, other public meaning originalists who seek 
to discern how informed lay people would have understood the Constitution should find our results 
valuable too.  See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 92 (2004) 
(looking to the “meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitu-
tional provision at the time of its enactment”); Michael D. Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and His-
torical Textualism, 73 MO. L. REV. 969, 975 (2008) (discussing “educated and informed speakers of 
the time”).  Finally, because most of the important drafters of the Constitution were lawyers or at 
least literate in law and government, see Meet the Framers of the Constitution, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/founding-fathers [https://perma.cc/NMJ4-JJ7D], original-
ists who focus on the intentions of the drafters should find our research about the legal and political 
meaning of “faithful execution” useful. 
KENT,  LEIB ,  SHUGERMAN    |     13
  
2118 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:2111 
faithful execution and be bound to follow and execute legal authority 
faithfully.  The models were everywhere.  Governors of American colo-
nies pre-independence, post-independence state governors, executive of-
ficers under the Articles of Confederation government, and other exec-
utives such as mayors and governors of corporations were required, 
before entering office, to take an oath for the due or faithful execution 
of their office.  These officials were directed to follow the standing law 
and stay within their limited authority as they executed their offices — 
just as the British monarch was by an oath taken at coronation.  Anyone 
experienced in law or government in 1787 would have been aware of 
this because it was so basic to what we might call the law of executive 
officeholding. 
Yet one of our most interesting findings here is that commands of 
faithful execution with duties that parallel Article II applied not only to 
senior government officials who might have been plausible models for 
the presidency in Article II, but also to a vast number of less significant 
officers.  It turns out that the U.S. President, who today bestrides the 
globe in the world’s most powerful office, has the commands of fidelity 
with antecedents dating back centuries in humble offices like town con-
stable, weigher of bricks, vestryman of the church, recorder of deeds, 
and inspector of flax and hemp.  In fact, this history shows that the 
framers did not borrow the language of the English coronation oaths 
(which did not include the word “faithful” or its synonyms), but instead 
borrowed from the “faithfulness” oaths of midlevel or lower offices.  
This, we argue, has historical and legal implications for debates among 
proponents of royalist and republican understandings of the presidency.31 
As we will trace below, this imposition of a duty of fidelity on offic-
ers — through oaths and otherwise — by the time of the framing had 
three basic components or substantive meanings.  Our first finding, con-
sistent with usage reported in contemporaneous dictionaries, is that 
faithful execution was repeatedly associated in statutes and other legal 
documents with true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, 
and impartial execution of law or office.  Second, the faithful execution 
duty was often imposed to prevent officeholders from misappropriating 
profits that the discretion inherent in their offices might afford them.  
Third, the duty was imposed because of a concern that officers might 
act ultra vires; the duty of faithful execution helped the officeholder in-
ternalize the obligation to obey the law, instrument, instruction, charter, 
or authorization that created the officer’s power. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 Compare PRAKASH, supra note 17, and ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: 
MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2014), with Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II 
Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (man-
uscript on file with authors). 
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What these three aspects of the duty of fidelity have in common is 
that they look a lot like fiduciary duties in the private law as they are 
understood today.32  The word “fiduciary” is derived from the Latin 
“fides,” meaning “faith,” and from “fiducia,” meaning “in trust”33 or a 
“position of trust” or “confidence.”34  Although decades of scholarship 
have traced the idea of public offices as “trusts” — private law fiduciary 
instruments — from Plato through Cicero and Locke,35 and several 
scholars have found ways to make points of contact between that tradi-
tion and our constitutional tradition,36 the Faithful Execution Clauses 
are substantial textual and historical commitments to what we would 
today call fiduciary obligations of the President.  We do not claim that 
the drafters at Philadelphia took ready-made fiduciary law off the shelf 
and wrote it into Article II.  But we do assert that the best historical 
understanding of the meaning of the Faithful Execution Clauses is that 
they impose duties that we today — and some in the eighteenth century 
as well — would call fiduciary. 
Our narrative history takes the following form: Part I retells the story 
of the role of the Faithful Execution Clauses at the Constitutional  
Convention and in the ratification debates in the states.  We also pursue 
linguistic usage and social practice of the eighteenth century to clarify 
what the Founding generation would have thought was involved in 
swearing an oath or affirming to faithfully execute an office, and being 
commanded to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  These tra-
ditional sources of original meaning remain insufficient, however. 
Part II thus performs a deeper historical inquiry into the meaning of 
faithful execution in the centuries leading up to the framing of the U.S. 
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 32 See Ethan J. Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A Critique, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1820, 1822 (2016). 
 33 See Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); 1 BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 
1075–76 (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., 2012); 2 HENRY JOHN ROBY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW IN 
THE TIMES OF CICERO AND OF THE ANTONINES 98 & n.2 (1902); THE OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 354 (C.T. Onions ed., 1966); ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE 
HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS 1 (3d ed. 1955). 
 34 Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); 2 ROBY, supra note 33, at 98 & n.2; 
VINTER, supra note 33, at 1; see OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY (P.G.W. Glare ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
 35 See J.W. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136 (2d ed. 1973); C.E. 
VAUGHAN, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 143–57 (1939); Ethan J. 
Leib & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Principles and Public Offices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF FIDUCIARY LAW 303 (Evan Criddle et al. eds., 2019). 
 36 See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDER-
STANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION 33–34 (2017); Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: 
The People and the State, in EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 131, 131 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995); 
Paul Finn, Public Trust and Public Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224, 228 (1994); Robert G. 
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1078–88 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Natelson, The Public Trust]; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: 
The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 
245 (2007) [hereinafter Natelson, Judicial Review]; Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 
52–53 (2010) [hereinafter Natelson, The Necessary and Proper Clause]. 
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Constitution.  Our archaeology starts in English law in the period of 
Magna Carta and proceeds through the early modern era.  We then ex-
plore the tumultuous seventeenth century of Stuart kings and two revo-
lutions, where we can identify transitions in the meaning of “faithful 
execution” and the law of officeholding.  We see this developed conception 
of faithful execution move through English law in Hanoverian Britain un-
til 1787.  We also focus attention on the other side of the Atlantic, studying 
North American colonial governments from their earliest days through the 
Revolution of 1776.  We then examine post-independence governance in the 
U.S. states and at the national level under the Continental/Confederation 
Congress.  On both sides of the Atlantic, then, we reveal oaths, com-
mands, and bonds of faithfulness that have for centuries in the Anglo-
American tradition applied to executive officers.  We delineate which 
offices were given these duties of loyalty — and how the demand of 
faithfulness developed over time. 
We then take these histories together in Part III to sketch an account 
of what the Faithful Execution Clauses in the U.S. Constitution would 
likely have been understood to mean in 1787.  Our history supports 
readings of Article II of the Constitution that limit Presidents to exercise 
their power only when it is motivated in the public interest rather than 
in their private self-interest, consistent with fiduciary obligation in the 
private law.  It also supports readings of Article II that tend to subordinate 
presidential power to congressional direction, requiring the President to 
follow the laws, instructions, and authorizations set in motion by the 
legislature.  As a corollary, these conclusions tend to undermine imperial 
and prerogative claims for the presidency, claims that are sometimes, in 
our estimation, improperly traced to dimensions of the Take Care and 
Presidential Oath Clauses.  What judicial precedent or historical 
“gloss”37 after 1787 adds to the meaning of “faithful execution” is beyond 
the scope of our investigation here.  But we think our historical recon-
struction has continued relevance to ongoing debates about Article II. 
It is, ultimately, not easy to know how to enforce the constitutional 
obligations we uncover.  The correct method of interpreting and apply-
ing the Constitution in the present day is endlessly contested, because it 
is unclear how to evaluate a President’s subjective motives and what to 
do about mixed motive cases.38  Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms 
we found for commands of faithful execution run the gamut from judi-
cial enforcement via damages, fines, injunctions, bond forfeiture, and 
criminal penalties, to impeachment and removal from office.  But on the 
substance of the President’s faithful execution duties in Article II, we 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 37 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012). 
 38 For a recent example of these difficulties, see the conflicting views in the briefs and opinions 
of the Justices in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), the travel ban case; and see also Andrew 
Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1108–14 (2018). 
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conclude that their original meaning includes at least 1) a strong concern 
about avoiding ultra vires action; 2) proscriptions against profit, bad
faith, and self-dealing; and 3) a duty of diligence nd carefulness. 
I.  FAITHFUL EXECUTION IN 1787–1788: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
CONVENTION, RATIFICATION, ND LINGUISTIC USAGE 
The primary sources for discovering the original meaning of the Con-
stitution — the records of debates about the framing and ratification of 
the Constitution, and documents evidencing contemporary linguistic us-
age, such as dictionaries — provide only some assistance with uncover-
ing the meaning of the Faithful Execution Clauses.  We briefly explore 
these sources here, both to emphasize some new findings and to motivate 
the need for deeper historical investigation.  We also address the mean-
ing of three other components of the clauses: the command to “take 
Care,”39 just what counts as “the Laws,”40 and the aspect of the presiden-
tial oath promising to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.”41 
A.  The Philadelphia Convention 
It is widely accepted that many delegates arrived in Philadelphia in 
the spring of 1787 convinced that the national government needed a 
strong executive.42  The government under the Articles of Confederation 
produced legislative resolves that were nominally binding on the states, 
but there were no means of enforcement, making them in practice prec-
atory.  After a few years of chaotic execution through ad hoc delegation 
and temporary committees, Congress placed management of war, diplo-
macy, public funds, and a postal system first in standing committees and 
then national-level officers or small departments answering directly to 
the Congress.43  But the Continental Congress was a large multimember 
body with frequently changing membership,44 meaning that executive 
management lacked stability, unity, efficiency, and secrecy. 
The experience under post-independence state constitutions also con-
vinced many Philadelphia Convention delegates and other nationalists 
that a strong executive was important to political stability.  The new 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. § 1.   
 42 See, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 150–53, 160–63 (1994); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESI-
DENCY, 1775–1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 65–70 (Liberty Fund 2007) (1923). 
 43 See, e.g., EDMUND CODY BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 118–21, 488–92 
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1964) (1941); JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLI-
TICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 193–203, 282–84 
(1979); JENNINGS B. SANDERS, EVOLUTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF THE  
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774–1789, at 70–71 (1935). 
 44 See RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 198. 
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Constitution.  Our archaeology starts in English law in the period of 
Magna Carta and proceeds through the early modern era.  We then ex-
plore the tumultuous seventeenth century of Stuart kings and two revo-
lutions, where we can identify transitions in the meaning of “faithful 
execution” and the law of officeholding.  We see this developed conception 
of faithful execution move through English law in Hanoverian Britain un-
til 1787.  We also focus attention on the other side of the Atlantic, studying 
North American colonial governments from their earliest days through the 
Revolution of 1776.  We then examine post-independence governance in the 
U.S. states and at the national level under the Continental/Confederation 
Congress.  On both sides of the Atlantic, then, we reveal oaths, com-
mands, and bonds of faithfulness that have for centuries in the Anglo-
American tradition applied to executive officers.  We delineate which 
offices were given these duties of loyalty — and how the demand of 
faithfulness developed over time. 
We then take these histories together in Part III to sketch an account 
of what the Faithful Execution Clauses in the U.S. Constitution would 
likely have been understood to mean in 1787.  Our history supports 
readings of Article II of the Constitution that limit Presidents to exercise 
their power only when it is motivated in the public interest rather than 
in their private self-interest, consistent with fiduciary obligation in the 
private law.  It also supports readings of Article II that tend to subordinate 
presidential power to congressional direction, requiring the President to 
follow the laws, instructions, and authorizations set in motion by the 
legislature.  As a corollary, these conclusions tend to undermine imperial 
and prerogative claims for the presidency, claims that are sometimes, in 
our estimation, improperly traced to dimensions of the Take Care and 
Presidential Oath Clauses.  What judicial precedent or historical 
“gloss”37 after 1787 adds to the meaning of “faithful execution” is beyond 
the scope of our investigation here.  But we think our historical recon-
struction has continued relevance to ongoing debates about Article II. 
It is, ultimately, not easy to know how to enforce the constitutional 
obligations we uncover.  The correct method of interpreting and apply-
ing the Constitution in the present day is endlessly contested, because it 
is unclear how to evaluate a President’s subjective motives and what to 
do about mixed motive cases.38  Moreover, the enforcement mechanisms 
we found for commands of faithful execution run the gamut from judi-
cial enforcement via damages, fines, injunctions, bond forfeiture, and 
riminal penalti s, to impeachment and removal from office.  But on the 
substance of the President’s faithful execution duties in Article II, we 
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 37 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413 (2012). 
 38 For a recent example of these difficulties, see the conflicting views in the briefs and opinions 
of the Justices in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), the travel ban case; a d see also Andrew 
Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1108–14 (2018). 
he number of bills passed by Congress 
is rapidly approaching zero, with 
legislative gridlock at an all-time high.
Rebecca Kysar’s research identifies a new 
category of legislation that Congress  
could use to overcome inertia. It is known  
as dynamic legislation—or legislation  
that updates itself automatically. 
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classic example of dynamic legislation is already used in the tax code, where 
parts of the code are indexed for inflation so that the rate brackets and certain 
deductions and credits do not get eroded by the rising cost of living. There is 
room, however, for Congress to use dynamic legislation in other contexts. Professor 
Kysar’s work provides the following insights:
• From the perspective of democratic considerations, dynamic legislation holds the 
most promise compared with other tools that Congress uses to alleviate gridlock. 
One reason dynamic legislation outperforms other devices designed to combat status 
quo bias is because it leverages the resources of the administrative state without 
succumbing to excessive deference, does not impermissibly entrench the current 
majority, and is not as susceptible to the pathologies of the political economy and 
budget processes as some other tools. 
• Dynamic legislation holds the most potential in areas where quantitative indices can 
be developed to minimize its design costs. It will also be desirable when the area of 
law presents acute concerns in the democratic categories outlined above—criteria in 
which dynamic legislation performs favorably. Notably, fiscal policy shares all of these 
qualities. This partially explains why this area already contains a greater degree of 
dynamic legislation than other areas.
• Yet dynamic legislation is underutilized in fiscal policy and other contexts. Using 
phase-ins and phase-outs that adjust according to varying circumstances, rather than 
static dates on the calendar, is one strategy that holds promise. So do countercyclical 
and regionally targeted laws. Laws might also be calibrated to one another or, like the 
2017 tax proposals, to a budgetary goal. 
A
Rebecca Kysar
Professor of Law 
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Dynamic Legislation
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 167, No. 4, page 809
A. The Democratic Benefits of Dynamic Legislation
In recent years, Congress has lurched from one fiscal or budget crisis to another. 
Expiring tax laws, government shutdowns, debt ceiling limits, and sequesters have cre-
ated an atmosphere of legislative chaos, requiring congressional action to avoid dire 
consequences. On the precipice of each cliff, real costs have ensued from the anticipa-
tion that Congress will fail to reach a deal. Future crises seem inevitable, as the nation’s 
debt repeatedly approaches the ceiling, clashes over annual spending levels increase, 
sequestration continues to loom, and temporary tax policies once again take hold.
Yet these events are of Congress’s own making, a direct and foreseeable product of 
the legal mechanisms it has created. Why then does Congress keep setting itself up 
for failure, creating games of chicken that have the potential to end catastrophically? 
In designing these mechanisms, Congress recognizes its limited capacity to respond 
to evolving circumstances. The legislative process contains a status quo bias, making 
congressional response to changing social, technological, environmental, econom-
ic, and foreign policy conditions challenging. Other factors have combined with 
constitutional design to create a system of government that, in the view of many, is 
hopelessly gridlocked. To compensate for the status quo bias in lawmaking, lawmakers 
have developed devices that aim to provide paths to legislative change, such as prod-
ding Congress into action by threatening policy cliffs or crises.
Although scholars have long addressed extra-congressional means of addressing this 
status quo bias, such as judicial expansion of the common law, dynamic statutory inter-
pretation, and agency delegation, only recently has focus shifted to these congressional 
tools. Assuming it is possible to achieve, locating the solution to legislative inertia 
within the lawmaking body itself, as opposed to the judiciary or agencies, is preferable 
from the perspective of institutional competence and separation of powers. Yet, as the 
legislative crises of the past decade demonstrate, those tools that Congress most often 
employs can have devastating effects. It thus seems wise to explore Congress’s entire 
arsenal of status quo devices, including those that are less often exercised.
The congressional status quo devices can be divided into three main categories. 
Procedural mechanisms—like the reconciliation process—may eliminate barriers 
to legislating. I label these mechanisms “veto bridges” as an antonym to the often 
used “veto gates,” which refer to those points in the legislative process that can de-
rail legislative proposals. Laws may also prompt Congress to act through sunset dates 
or penalties like sequestration or other undesirable policy outcomes. I identify this 
category as “prompting legislation.” Finally, the legislative product itself may auto-
matically update without further action by Congress through the use of what I call 
EXCERPT
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“dynamic legislation.” This type of legislation spontaneously adjusts legal rules to fu-
ture circumstances based on predetermined, external criteria.
I contend that it is this last category—dynamic legislation—that has the most un-
tapped potential from a democratic process perspective. Specifically, I argue that 
dynamic legislation outperforms the other status quo devices because it leverages the 
resources of the administrative state without succumbing to excessive deference, does 
not impermissibly entrench the current majority, and is not as susceptible to the pa-
thologies of the political economy and budget processes. Democratic considerations, 
in other words, weigh in favor of dynamic legislation as a preferred tool against leg-
islative inertia. This Article thus builds the case that dynamic legislation has much to 
offer categorically. It therefore departs from the scant scholarship that exists on the 
topic, which has traditionally judged dynamic legislation from the standpoint of the 
particular policies at issue.
Before addressing solutions to the status quo bias in American lawmaking, however, 
one may rightfully ask if there is even a problem. After all, the Constitution’s many 
hurdles to lawmaking are part of its contemplated design, intentionally balancing be-
tween policy stability and the whims of majority rule. Gridlock in American politics 
is thus nothing new. In addition to the constitutional requirements of bicameralism 
and presentment, however, internal congressional practices such as committee ap-
proval and supermajority rules also create further, extra-constitutional obstacles to 
policymaking. In the current era, heightened partisanship and increasing demands 
upon Congress’s constrained agenda have taken the political impasse to a degree and 
occurrence rate unimagined by the Framers. These dynamics have left a host of unad-
dressed problems plaguing the nation, and new strategies are needed to restore the 
functioning of the United States government. Dynamic legislation should be part of 
that toolset.
One way in which dynamic legislation outperforms the other status quo devices is its 
interaction with the administrative state. Delegation to agencies has long been recog-
nized as a cure to the inability of Congress to respond to changing circumstances. The 
cost of this delegation, however, is congressional loss of control over policymaking. 
Congress could make such delegations temporary in order, for instance, to protect 
against a future President’s policy preferences diverging from its own. A better solu-
tion, and one that does not require so many future legislative resources, might be to 
delegate to the agency but within automatically adjusting parameters. 
Entrenchment considerations also support dynamic legislation. An implicit consti-
tutional limitation on entrenchment prevents “one legislature [from] bind[ing] the 
legislative authority of its successors.” At first glance, dynamic legislation seems to do 
just that by reducing the opportunities for future legislators to revisit policy choices of 
the past. But, as I will explain, it is actually less noxious from an entrenchment stand-
point than prompting legislation, which demands significant legislative attention by 
generally reverting to older, less desirable policy. In so doing, prompting legislation 
crowds out other legislative agenda items. Worse, it does so at a single point in time, 
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which can exacerbate the entrenchment effect if Congress’s attention is divided on 
other matters. In contrast, dynamic legislation has the potential to reduce the demands 
upon Congress’s agenda by freeing it from the obligation to update legislation contin-
ually in light of evolving circumstances. 
Fairness and political economy considerations also weigh in favor of dynamic legisla-
tion. The transient nature of veto bridges, for instance, exacerbates troubling dynamics 
within Congress. A majority of each house can change its legislative rules. When 
those rules are used to expedite legislation, the result is often an impermanent set of 
parameters that changes along party lines. This makes procedural rules vulnerable to 
accusations of unfairness in the democratic process, which is especially troubling giv-
en their purported function of setting out neutral ground rules that apply equally to 
all participants in the lawmaking process. 
Prompting legislation also suffers from fairness concerns because the triggering 
event—set to harm those least able to tolerate the default outcome—often falls on 
party lines. Sequestration, for instance, penalizes those who wish to keep spending 
levels constant. Sunsetted tax cuts, on the other hand, punish those who wish to keep 
tax cuts in place. Prompting legislation may further exacerbate partisanship by creat-
ing policy cliffs that can lead to games of chicken.
Dynamic legislation avoids these difficulties by not requiring, and indeed minimizing, 
future congressional actions. The policy is set to change depending on external con-
ditions, and it is likely unclear at the outset who will benefit and who will be harmed 
from those automatic changes. It thus comes closer to placing interested parties be-
hind the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.” Relatedly, dynamic legislation may produce 
less interest group activity since its long-term effects will be unknown. In stark con-
trast, prompting legislation will generally increase the extraction of rents from interest 
groups by creating a period during which benefits are likely to be distributed to know-
able interest groups and by continually threatening policy cliffs. 
Another significant but often overlooked axis along which we should measure the 
status quo devices is their interaction with the budget process. Prompting legislation 
has toxic effects upon this process. Devices like sequestration have generally proven to 
be too harsh or too lenient to be effective, and temporary legislation goes unpaid for 
due to budgetary gimmicks. Dynamic legislation does not provide the same oppor-
tunity for evasion of budgetary rules. Because dynamic legislation does not require 
subsequent congressional action, Congress cannot exploit differences in the budget-
ary treatment of two congressional actions—a dynamic that occurs in the context of 
prompting legislation. 
From a practical perspective, each of the aforementioned tools have limitations. Veto 
bridges are unenforceable and non-substantive in nature. Prompting legislation dis-
rupts planning by private and public actors. Dynamic legislation is often costly to 
design, requiring information upfront. The impact of these limitations is context-spe-
cific, but dynamic legislation holds the most potential in areas where quantitative 
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indices can be developed to minimize its design costs. It also will be desirable when 
the area of law presents acute concerns in the democratic categories outlined above—
criteria in which dynamic legislation performs favorably.
Notably, fiscal policy shares all of these qualities. This partially explains why this area 
already contains a greater degree of dynamic legislation than other areas. Several 
features of the tax code, for instance, are indexed to inflation. Just recently, during 
consideration of the 2017 tax bill, lawmakers proposed that the bill’s tax cuts be auto-
matically ratcheted down if the bill failed to generate sufficient economic growth, and 
that other tax increases would be turned off if a revenue hurdle was met.
Other areas of fiscal policy also utilize dynamic legislation to some extent. For instance, 
certain unemployment insurance benefits are keyed off a state’s overall unemploy-
ment level. Some features of Social Security are indexed for inflation, and Medicare 
premiums are tied to health care costs to an extent. Even still, dynamic legislation is 
underutilized in these and other contexts. The design features of dynamic legislation 
could be particularly useful in certain contexts. 
B. Potential Applications
1. Countercyclical Measures
In times of economic downturn, lawmakers and regulators can employ tools to assist 
in stabilizing the economy. Monetary policy is the most often employed countercy-
clical measure largely because the Federal Reserve can quickly adjust interest rates in 
response to economic conditions. Post–Great Recession, however, many economists 
have questioned whether monetary policy alone is a sufficient response, especially in 
the face of dramatic downturns. There might be a floor, for instance, to which inter-
est rates can be lowered without harmfully impacting the dollar or creating future 
bubbles. Fiscal policy, such as increased spending and tax cuts, may then be necessary. 
Other advantages to fiscal policy are that they are often faster acting and can be crafted 
to reach specific recipients. 
Still, economists and others often distrust countercyclical fiscal measures because of 
design difficulties. In order to be effective and not counterproductive, fiscal stimu-
lus must be “timely, temporary, and targeted.” Dynamic legislation can be utilized to 
achieve all three of these factors, and so could be employed in the countercyclical 
context, both in the tax and spending areas. First, dynamic legislation can be designed 
to immediately spring into life once a measure of economic weakness occurs, thus 
ensuring that the legislative response is timely. Possible triggers could be the unem-
ployment rate, negative economic growth, or when the federal funds rate is at or near 
0%. Dynamic legislation can also phase out as conditions, such as the unemployment 
rate, improve to ensure it is temporary. Finally, fiscal policy generally allows for target-
ed relief—for instance to the middle and lower classes—in a way that monetary policy 
cannot. Dynamic legislation might offer the ability to target measures even further. 
For instance, it could be used to deliver benefits to those regions most affected by the 
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downturn. Regional provisions are discussed below.
Recent scholarship has focused on how the legal system might respond to macro-
economic conditions. For instance, Zachary Liscow has proposed that bankruptcy 
rules be “countercyclical,” prescribing that bankruptcy judges consider the employ-
ment effects of their cases based on the unemployment rate. Although interesting, this 
proposal suffers from the critique that it stretches the institutional competence of the 
judiciary, which may be ill-equipped to make judgments concerning the economy at 
large. A Congress-centered approach that sets countercyclical measures into motion 
upon the presence of certain indicators as is proposed herein, does not face this struc-
tural critique. 
2. Regionally Targeted Legislation
Another area where dynamic legislation could be effectively employed is legislation 
targeted to regions. Fine-tuning federal policy in this manner might generate positive 
welfare effects. Take, for instance, the fact that federal taxes are assessed on nominal 
incomes, without regard to cost of living differences between areas. This policy dis-
courages taxpayers from working and living in higher-paying cities. Although salaries 
and property values adjust to make up for the federal tax disparity, the non-neutrality 
between tax bills in locales results in an inefficient employment distribution. Indexing 
taxes to local wages, however, would neutralize most of this distortion. 
Automatically tying federal benefits to the specific needs of a region could also be 
beneficial from fairness and budgetary standpoints. In the countercyclical context, for 
instance, extensions of federal unemployment insurance are automatically triggered 
if state unemployment conditions exceed a certain threshold. This type of program 
has the potential to engender fairness by ensuring the residents of the neediest states 
receive benefits. It also saves costs by narrowly tailoring benefits and by allowing those 
benefits to be calculated with administrative ease. 
Extending regional automatic mechanisms to other spending programs could produce 
similar benefits. Suppose, for instance, that Congress adopted measures to address the 
opioid epidemic, which is a nationwide crisis with varying and fluctuating degrees 
of severity across regions. It could decide to allocate funds on a continuing basis ac-
cording to the extent of the crisis at the state level, using factors such as overdose and 
addiction rates. Other crises could be addressed in a similar manner. Ongoing disaster- 
preparedness funds, for instance, could be distributed to states in accordance with 
their climate-related risks. Or funds for adult education could be distributed to those 
states hit hardest by the overall decline in manufacturing jobs. 
Dynamic legislation allows Congress to adapt federal policy to regional needs. The 
political events of the twenty-first century suggest widespread frustration that the 
federal government has failed to address the fact that the rewards and strains of the 
modern economy fall unevenly across states, creating winners and losers. We can ex-
pect that the complexities of challenges like globalization, the displacement of jobs by 
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technology, and climate change will continue to have varied, regional effects. Rather 
than employing blunt instruments, the federal government would benefit states by us-
ing carefully crafted remedies. With dynamic legislation, Congress can do so without 
needing to continually revisit the law and without ceding control over policy to the 
executive branch.
3. Intra-legal and Budgetary Measuress
a. Overall Budget Constraints
One most naturally thinks of dynamic legislation as allowing for the law to adjust 
based on external factors. Dynamic legislation, however, can also be used so that the 
law responds to changes within other parts of the legal system. This would create in-
teresting opportunities to coordinate broad social policies across areas of law by tying 
them together. For instance, health care policy could be adjusted, not only for current 
health care costs, but also for current entitlement commitments and tax expenditures 
in the area.
Intra-legal measures might be especially powerful when used in conjunction with an 
overall budget constraint. In contrast to internal budget rules, the budgetary con-
straint could be built into the substance of the law. Congress thus would find it much 
less easy to evade. For instance, in the early 1980s, proposed legislation would have 
limited the amount of revenue lost to tax expenditures to no more than thirty percent 
of the net revenues collected in the fiscal year. The mechanism, however, was a proce-
dural rule, enforced by a point of order, against any budget resolution that contained 
tax expenditures exceeding thirty percent of the recommended level for net revenue 
set forth in the resolution. Congress could thus easily evade the rule due to its proce-
dural status. 
One could imagine, however, this budget constraint, or something similar, embedded 
within the substantive statute. For instance, the prior year’s revenues could dictate the 
total level of tax expenditures available to taxpayers. If revenue benchmarks are met, 
then the tax expenditures could be automatically granted in whole. 
In the Social Security context, David Kamin has suggested that benefits and taxes be 
automatically adjusted if the system is projected to become insolvent. On the tax side, 
for instance, the payroll tax rates could be automatically increased (or decreased if the 
projections improve). On the spending side, benefits could be automatically reduced, 
perhaps hitting only new beneficiaries or those with higher lifetime earnings. To de-
velop this further, it is also possible that the spending and tax changes be tied to one 
another. For instance, suppose lawmakers are committed to solvency but can tolerate 
only so much in benefit cuts. The tax increases could be structured such that they 
make up any shortfall in the system’s solvency after taking into account the savings 
produced by the benefit cuts. 
On a more ambitious level, David Scott Louk and David Gamage have argued that de-
fault budget policies, which are triggered if legislators do not pass a budget, could cure 
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the games of chicken and negotiating failures that have come to define the “new fiscal 
politics.” A default budget at the federal level could be implemented, they suggest, by 
updating the prior year’s budget to reflect changes in population and the economy, 
assigning an agency the task of adjusting taxes and spending based on predetermined 
formulas.
b. “Reverse Earmarking”
Some states have experimented with tying revenues to budgetary constraints. At the 
federal level and in most states, the gas tax is calculated on a per-unit (typically gal-
lon) basis, not as a percentage of purchase price. As a result, gas tax revenues do not 
increase as gasoline prices rise. Indeed, in the current era, increasing fuel efficiency 
and inflation have devastated revenues from the gas tax, both at the federal and state 
levels. In response, some states have begun indexing the gas tax rate to inflation or 
to a percentage of the price of gas. In a more unorthodox move, Nebraska adjusts 
the gas tax to the state’s transportation spending in an attempt to ensure adequate 
revenues for transportation projects. Nebraska’s gas tax is analogous to the practice 
of earmarking, which dedicates revenues to a specific purpose, but differs in import-
ant respects. Earmarking is pursued in order to guarantee steady sources of funding 
for the program at issue, but it is criticized for reducing the legislature’s flexibility in 
establishing funding priorities. A tax like the Nebraska gas tax—let’s call it “reverse 
earmarking”—allows the government to ascertain first its spending priorities in cer-
tain areas and then adjusts the tax accordingly to fund those priorities. This type of 
mechanism could ensure funding of specific government activities without forcing the 
government’s hand as to spending levels ex ante. 
States have also capped tax rates to maintain a static amount of revenue from year to 
year. This is done at the property tax level in response to concerns that local govern-
ments were receiving extra revenues as property values increased. These automatically 
adjusting rates generate the same amount of revenues from year to year even though 
the value of the tax base has changed. Reverse earmarking is essentially a less libertari-
an version of this mechanism, instead adjusting tax rates based on current government 
spending. 
c. Tax “Triggers” and Responsible Tax Cutting
States have also recently experimented with so called tax “triggers,” which phase in tax 
cuts or other tax reform measures when the state meets pre-established fiscal targets, 
such as growth in revenues. The triggers are justified on the basis of promoting fiscal 
responsibility, although the states’ experiences on this front have been mixed. For in-
stance, in 2014, Oklahoma tied tax cuts to estimated revenues as opposed to actual 
revenues, causing tax cuts to be triggered even though the state’s deficits were rapidly 
increasing. The legislature was then forced to repeal the trigger so that a second round 
of tax cuts did not go into effect. In contrast, in 2014, the District of Columbia en-
acted tax cuts that were triggered when actual, realized revenue exceeded budgeted 
revenue. Revenues, in fact, increased, and the tax cuts are scheduled to go into effect 
in 2018. 
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Triggers have the potential to allow governments some degree of predictability in 
their revenue stream while also letting an increase in revenues to be designated for 
tax relief, allowing for a phenomenon that we might call “responsible tax cutting.” 
Triggers could also assist in achieving consensus over broader tax reform. For instance, 
if agreement cannot be reached over appropriate revenue offsets for tax cuts, the cuts 
might be delayed to go into effect when revenue goals are attained. Experience with 
the triggers, however, underscores that they must be carefully designed—a lesson that 
can be extended to all dynamic legislation. In addition to accounting for actual reve-
nues, triggers should also account for actual revenue growth rather than the effects of 
inflation or a temporary rebound in revenues. They should, for instance, be based on 
multi-year estimates of revenues and spending. 
During the 2017 debate over tax reform, revenue triggers were explored. Senate deficit 
hawks proposed to roll back the tax cuts in TCJA if the law’s deficit impact turned 
out to be worse than advertised. It is important, however, that any such triggers not be 
used in a symbolic fashion to justify unaffordable tax cuts. The targets contemplated 
in the TCJA trigger were too modest in comparison to the huge revenue losses of 
the bill, making up for only about 10% of the bill’s increase to the debt in the budget 
window period. 
Collectively, these examples show that states, as “laboratories of democracy,” have al-
ready begun experimenting with dynamic legislation in the budgeting context. The 
federal government can benefit from their experiences. Indeed recent federal tax 
proposals seem to suggest that automatically adjusting budget-related measures are 
spreading to the national arena, although caution should be exercised in their design. 
4. Pigouvian Taxes
Another area where dynamic legislation should be considered is in the Pigouvian tax 
context. Under economy theory, markets fail when parties do not bear the full costs 
of their actions, thereby producing negative externalities. Governments can impose 
Pigouvian taxes in the amount of such externalities, which thus causes the parties to 
internalize the costs of their actions. The parties are then able to make an economical-
ly efficient decision, weighing an action’s full costs upon the world against its benefits. 
Of course, assessing the social costs of the activity, and hence the correct level of tax-
ation, still poses design challenges. Dynamic legislation could address one aspect of 
this complexity—the social costs of an activity, or the information used to calculate 
them, may not be static. A unit of pollution may impact society differently from year 
to year. In that case, a tax assessed on the pollution itself may be correct initially but 
may then deviate from the socially optimal level if the social harm per unit increas-
es or decreases. For instance, new information may indicate that the climate is more 
sensitive to carbon dioxide emissions than previously thought. Dynamic legislation, 
perhaps coupled with delegation to a regulating entity, could dynamically adjust the 
tax rates to account for these changes. 
Many in the environmental field challenge the idea that setting tax rates equal to the 
social costs of the pollution is sufficient since this will not necessarily result in the 
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reduction of emissions. The argument is that the tax must also be greater than the 
marginal cost of abatement, otherwise the polluting firm will not reduce emissions. 
Dynamic legislation could also be employed to address this challenge by dynami-
cally adjusting the tax in response to whether current activities or behaviors, in this 
case emissions, exceed or fall short of a target level. Dynamic legislation, in this case, 
leverages the additional information that the implementation of the tax would pro-
vide—the cost of abatement. 
One carbon tax proposal, for instance, would create an initial tax, coupled with a 
standard growth rate for the tax that would be applicable during a control period. 
Emission targets could be set for certain time intervals. If the targets were unmet, the 
imposition of a higher growth rate for the tax would be triggered, which would turn 
off once emissions fell below the target.
5. Nontraditional Phase-Ins and Phase-Outs
Another promising application would be to use dynamic legislation to phase-in leg-
islative changes. There is an old adage that legal reforms produce winners and losers. 
Phase-ins can mitigate the negative impact upon certain parties. Typically, phase-ins 
work by gradually implementing policies as time passes. Rather than make the transi-
tion contingent on dates, however, one could employ dynamic legislation to make the 
provisions contingent upon the occurrence of external events. This type of phase-in 
could be particularly useful where new policies present uncertainties as to how they 
will interact with the real world. One could design the legislative phase-in so that the 
change is ratcheted up only after certain events occur or if there is evidence that the 
change is generating the desired effects. 
For instance, central to a recent tax reform proposal was a cash flow destination-based 
tax, which would have turned the current corporate income tax into essentially a con-
sumption tax. The plan was border adjusted, meaning that it excludes exports and 
taxes imports without deduction for costs. Controversially, the plan may have im-
pacted prices on imports. Under economic models, the value of the dollar should, 
however, correspondingly increase, making the tax neutral vis-à-vis American 
consumers and importers. Skepticism in the business and investment community re-
garding the currency adjustments, however, turned out to be a major political obstacle 
to its enactment. 
One way to assuage those nervous about relying on untested models would be to 
phase-in the tax, not simply across time, but to peg its introduction to the dollar 
adjustment. The tax rate could be designed such that it increases by a specified per-
centage for every x% increase in the dollar. This transition rule would minimize any 
negative effects on consumers and importers because the lower rate would cap the 
impact on consumer prices, perhaps assuaging critics to a sufficient degree to allow for 
enactment of the tax. 
Tom Merrill and David Schizer’s petroleum fuel price stabilization plan (PFSP) also 
proposes dynamic phase-ins. The PFSP would set a floor of $3.50–$4.00 per gallon 
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of gas and would assess a fuel levy if the price of gas fell below that threshold. The levy 
would rise as world oil prices fell and, conversely, would fall as prices rose. One ver-
sion of the plan employs a traditional phase-in, raising the price threshold over time. 
However, another variation adopts a type of nontraditional phase-in by providing 
that the threshold trail any upward movements of the retail price, until the threshold 
is set to the desired level. 
C. Conclusion
In summary, this Article argues that, along democratic axes, dynamic legislation 
categorically outperforms other devices—such as reconciliation, sequestration, and 
sunsets—that Congress uses to temper the status quo bias in American lawmaking. 
Dynamic legislation allows Congress to retain some control over policy by avoiding or 
narrowing delegation to agencies, without expending resources on constantly updating 
the law. Dynamic legislation frees later Congresses to effectuate their agenda, rather 
than to simply race against changing environs to keep original legislative bargains in 
place. Dynamic legislation also has the potential to function like a veil of ignorance 
rule—bestowing benefits and burdens upon unknown constituencies—and thus re-
duces interest group activity. Finally, by removing the need for future congressional 
actions, dynamic legislation reduces opportunities for budgetary gamesmanship. 
Dynamic legislation may even improve upon the budget process by statutorily peg-
ging policy to revenue goals.
As a result of these benefits, Congress should make more frequent and creative use of 
dynamic legislation, especially in areas of law that present democratic concerns and 
where the availability of quantitative measures reduces design costs, such as fiscal pol-
icy. Although our laws will never entirely be on autopilot, dynamic legislation equips 
Congress with a tool to better maintain its legislative intent across time. 
ourts and scholars have long found  
it difficult, if not impossible,  
to determine whether seemingly 
“neutral” government acts—that is, 
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are the product of malicious intent.
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28    |     FORDHAM LAW
C
LANDAU    |     29
In Process Scrutiny, Professor Landau provides a framework to address problems within the current jurisprudence, demonstrating how the process of government decision-making can provide revelatory indicators of governmental intent. The theory of 
process scrutiny has the following core features:
• Process Scrutiny focuses on “small-p” process, including the quality or duration of 
deliberation, the involvement of experts, the facilitation of regular public hearings 
and open debate, as well as the documentation of studies and reasoning behind 
various policies.
• These more visible, small-p procedures are far easier to identify and put into practice 
than alternative procedural frameworks that have been proposed by other scholars. 
• Such objective criteria help decipher political branch intent without resorting to a 
judge’s subjective interpretation of a given policy.
• An inquiry into small-p process works in both directions: While courts accord greater 
scrutiny to legislative acts that undermine well-established procedures, they also give 
leeway to otherwise suspect policy choices that are the result of a thorough vetting.
• These review mechanisms are not limited to analysis of ex ante processes—for 
example, the quality of deliberation, involvement of experts, or other procedures 
that precede a government enactment. To the contrary, courts may also examine 
constitutionality through analyses of ex post procedures—that is, a government’s 
ability to abide by the rules and procedures that are contained within a law or other 
enactment itself.
Joseph Landau
Professor of Law 
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Introduction
Judicial inquiries into political branch motivation have long vexed courts and scholars.1 
Especially difficult are questions regarding judicial review of facially neutral govern-
ment action—whether legislative or executive—that are challenged on constitutional 
grounds. The canonical decision in this arena, Washington v. Davis, holds that facially 
neutral legislation or administrative action resulting in a disparate impact on the basis 
of race or gender will not, without more, trigger heightened scrutiny.2 More specifical-
ly, Davis requires evidence of discriminatory intent to trigger more careful scrutiny of 
government action. One major criticism of the Court’s intent doctrine is that it permits 
policymakers to conceal invidious purposes behind facially neutral language in stat-
utes as well as various forms of executive action. For this reason, many argue that Davis 
perversely licenses state-sponsored discrimination by encouraging government actors 
to hide their true motives behind facially neutral language, obscuring malicious intent 
from judicial review.3 
1  See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 Cornell L. Rev. 1211, 1215 (2018) 
(observing that “the federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single definition of discriminatory intent, 
or a consistent approach to the evidentiary tools through which it is substantiated”); Richard H. Fallon Jr., 
Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 523, 528 (2016) (noting that Supreme 
Court cases display “varied approaches to the identification of legislative intent,” some of which are “wholly 
coherent” and others which “manifest ambiguity”). Importantly, Fallon’s critique of the Supreme Court’s 
intent jurisprudence is limited to the “peculiar problems posed by judicial inquiries into the intentions of 
multimember legislative bodies.” Id. at 530. See also Michael C. Dorf, Even A Dog: A Response to Professor 
Fallon, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 86, 86 (2016) (agreeing on the one hand that the Court’s doctrine on impermissible 
legislative intent is mostly unsatisfactory, while challenging Fallon’s decision to treat review of legislative action 
differently from executive and administrative action); Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate 
Discrimination, 104 Va. L. Rev. 1471, 1480 (2018) (noting that “[i]ntent standards have practical limitations, 
and critics are right to point to difficulties in defining and proving intent” but they carry with it the “virtue of 
deterring extremely damaging conduct”).
2  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (upholding an entrance exam for police officers in 
the District of Columbia that African Americans tended to fail at higher rates than whites and refusing to 
apply more exacting scrutiny in the absence of compelling evidence of racially based motivation); see also Vill. 
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (holding that a town’s refusal 
to rezone a tract of land to allow for development of multi-family dwellings was not motivated by a racially 
discriminatory purpose or intent, despite the disparate impact the zoning decision had on the African-
American population); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979) (upholding legislation in 
Massachusetts giving preference for veterans in civil service positions despite the law’s discriminatory impact on 
female applicants).
3  See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1136 (1997) (arguing that the intent doctrine comprises a larger 
body of case law formally ending substantive equality and is an illustration of how modern equal protection 
doctrine “no longer protects”); Girardeau A. Spann, Good Faith Discrimination, 23 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 
585, 623 (2015) (arguing “that the current Washington v. Davis and Feeney distinction between actuating and 
incidental intent has outlived any usefulness that it may ever have had”); Yvonne Elosiebo, Implicit Bias and 
Equal Protection: A Paradigm Shift, 42 N.Y.U. Rev. L. Soc. Change 451, 487 (2018) (arguing that because it is 
“nearly impossible . . . to prove discriminatory purpose in court, . . . Washington v. Davis should be overruled.”); 
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This Article seeks to overcome the difficulties of operationalizing the Court’s intent 
standard by showing how more easily detectable kinds of procedural failure—or “small 
p” process—can help surface forms of improper intent that are otherwise hard to see. A 
number of commonly used procedures—such as the quality or duration of deliberation, 
the involvement of experts, the facilitation of regular public hearings and open debate, 
and the documentation of studies and reasoning behind various policies—provide ob-
jective indicators that can be highly useful in discovering political branch motivation. 
Small-p procedures are different from the strain of procedural failure famously articu-
lated by process theorist John Hart Ely that provides a classic rationale for heightened 
scrutiny.4 In contrast to Ely’s brand of process failure based upon the Constitution’s role 
in preserving accessibility to the political process—what this Article refers to as “Big-P” 
process5—are those more evident, small-p procedures commonly used by the political 
branches that govern the underlying vetting, or lack thereof, within a given act.6 
Though the elegance and power of Ely’s theory has ensured its rightful place in our 
constitutional canon,7 the theory has a blind spot—it cannot ferret out many forms of 
discrimination that are hidden from plain sight by more sophisticated lawmakers. And 
in a world in which invidious discrimination easily hides behind facially neutral lan-
guage, Ely’s theory provides little help for courts in determining whether a particular 
minority group deserves representation-reinforcing judicial review. This Article suggests 
a means to fill the void in Ely’s theory of Big-P process theory by showing how courts 
Charles R. Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 Conn. L. Rev. 931, 944 (2008) (advancing “the more fundamental argument 
that Davis was wrong because the injury of racial inequality exists irrespective of the motives of the defendants 
in a particular case”); Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 764 (“If legislators 
have the wit—which they generally do—to avoid words like ‘race’ or the name of a particular racial group 
in the text of their legislation, the courts will generally apply ordinary rational basis review. This tendency is 
true even if the state action has an egregiously negative impact on a protected group.”); Bertrall L. Ross, The 
Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 
175 (2013) (arguing that the equal protection intent standard created has been applied inconsistently). 
4  See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
5  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead – Reflections on Affirmative 
Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 685, 688 (1991) (defending the 
appropriateness of Carolene Products–style protection in the racial discrimination context, on the grounds that 
racial minorities have not achieved “full political equality”); Peter Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote 
and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely Vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 
Const. Comment. 277, 287 (1995) (contrasting the “process-based orientation” of Louis Lusky and Ely’s 
interpretation of Footnote Four with Stone’s view of the same as a statement of “the ‘preferred position’ of non-
economic rights”); Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering: The Lion in Winter, 
114 Yale L. J. 1329, 1332-33 (2005) (discussing Ely’s representation-reinforcement theory in the context of 
legislative apportionment).
6  For the purposes of this Article, the words “procedure” and “process” are used largely interchangeably. 
References to “small-p” processes or procedures are intended to refer to any of the myriad steps taken by 
governmental actors that culminate in the promulgation of a law or the formation of an administrative rule or 
order. The former is often used in a broader context than the latter. Compare Procedure, Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2012) (defining procedure as “a series of steps followed in a regular definite 
order”) with Process, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2012) (defining process as “a series of 
actions or operations conducing to an end”). 
7  See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, The Importance of Being Elegant, 42 Ohio State L. J. 427, 430 (1981); 
Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 Va L. Rev. 641, 646 (1991) (“Ely’s argument is 
ingenious, elegant, and plausible.”); Jane S. Schacter, Ely and the Idea of Democracy, 57 Stan L. Rev. 737, 737 
(2004) (“Ely’s elegant extrapolation of footnote four has profoundly affected my own thinking…”); Alan M. 
Dershowitz, In Memoriam: John Hart Ely, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1743, 1744 (2004) (describing Ely’s theory as 
“elegant in its simplicity though often complex in its application.”) 
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can and have analyzed small-p process failures to shed light on forms of improper intent 
that are otherwise hard to see. In other words, there is ample room in the Court’s intent 
doctrine to overcome the difficulties of uncovering and operationalizing Big-P process 
failure. By shifting the inquiry from interest-group dynamics in the legislative process to 
more ordinary forms of process, this Article calls on courts and commentators to consid-
er how small-p indicia can surface intent across a range of legislative and administrative 
contexts, and in ways that are consistent with established doctrine. Furthermore, the 
strain of procedural review outlined in this Article is not limited to analysis of ex ante 
processes—for example, the quality of deliberation, involvement of experts, and other 
procedures that precede a government enactment. To the contrary, courts may also ex-
amine constitutionality through analyses of ex post procedures—that is, a government’s 
ability to abide by the rules and procedures that are contained within a law or other 
enactment itself.8 
A number of recent cases provide powerful evidence that small-p procedures can pro-
vide a basis for enhanced judicial scrutiny on the one hand, or a vindicating mechanism 
on the other. From voter identification to LGBT rights, from takings to affirmative ac-
tion, and from national security to military personnel policies, courts rely on small-p 
process to analyze the legitimacy of government action. And the analysis can work in 
both directions. On the one hand, the government’s lack of procedural care can invite 
greater scrutiny and form a basis for invalidation. Conversely, where the government 
can demonstrate a thorough vetting method, reviewing courts will frequently sustain 
challenged acts having negative consequences for various groups, and even go so far as to 
remove the taint of improper motivation. 
Hawaii v. Trump is a paradigmatic example of both phenomena.9 In the aftermath of the 
travel ban’s first two iterations, lower courts that seemed uncomfortable striking down 
executive action based on the President’s campaign statements routinely focused on 
small-p process, noting how the Executive’s lack of coordination, deliberation, or con-
sultation with agency experts lessened the case for deference.10 By contrast, by the time 
the third version of the ban reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts could 
tout the government’s “comprehensive” and “worldwide” ex ante procedures,11 as well as 
8  See infra section III.B (analyzing both the ex ante and ex post dimensions of process scrutiny to show 
how courts may also vindicate governmental policies, or smoke out improper motivation, by scrutinizing an 
enacting body’s ability or failure to conform to its own stated procedures).
9  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393 (2018). 
10  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 601 (4th Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded 
sub nom., 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
11  See, e.g., Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2404 (noting that the President “directed a worldwide review”); id. 
(describing temporary measures until “completion of the worldwide review”); id. at 2408 (“The President 
lawfully exercised [his] discretion based on his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency review—
that entry of the covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interest.”); id. (the President ordered 
“DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s compliance with 
the information and risk assessment baseline,” followed by “a Proclamation setting forth extensive findings 
describing how deficiencies in the practices of select foreign governments . . . deprive the Government of 
[information],” and concluded “that it was in the national interest to restrict entry of aliens who could 
not be vetted with adequate information—both to protect national security and public safety, and to 
induce improvement by their home countries.”); id. at 2412 (noting how “the multi-agency review process 
[determined] whether those high-risk countries provide a minimum baseline of information to adequately vet 
their nationals”); id. at 2421 (“The Proclamation, moreover, reflects the results of a worldwide review process 
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its ex post procedures, including a promised set of robust exemptions and guidance to 
agents in the field.12 
Ultimately, this Article employs ex ante and ex post small-p process to lay a founda-
tion for a better understanding and application of discriminatory intent doctrine—a 
line of precedent that, while receiving tremendous scholarly attention,13 cannot be fully 
comprehended without grappling with its underlying procedural roots. Although the 
dynamic relationship between process failure and improper motive (or its close cousin, 
animus)14 finds some expression in the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—and 
in particular Justice Powell’s decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation15—commentators have largely overlooked how 
procedural regularity can serve as a constitutional compass directing further judicial in-
quiry into the underlying intent of a given law or policy.16 Indeed, Powell’s process-based 
criteria provide especially helpful indicators in uncovering forms of discrimination that 
are easily masked using facially neutral language.17 And a number of recent cases support 
this Article’s thesis that the “due process of lawmaking”18 and governmental motivation 
are often perceived in lockstep fashion, a point that has special salience for novel rights 
claims.19 
undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies.”). The government made repeated references to 
this process throughout the briefing, see, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 2, 5, 15, 16, 30, 58, 60, 63-66, Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965) and at the outset of oral argument before the Supreme Court. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965) (“Mr. Chief 
Justice, and may it please the Court: After a worldwide multi-agency review. . . .”).
12  See Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2406 (noting “case-by-case waivers when a foreign national demonstrates 
undue hardship, and that his entry is in the national interest and would not pose a threat to public safety” 
and that “[t]he Proclamation further directs DHS to assess on a continuing basis whether entry restrictions 
should be modified or continued, and to report to the President every 180 days”); id. at 37 (noting that the 
Proclamation calls for continued assessments by DHS, periodic updates to the President and guidance to 
consular officials). See also Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45169 (Sept. 24, 2017) (establishing 
waiver program for, inter alia, foreign nationals who had previously been admitted to the United States for 
the purposes of work or study; those with “significant contacts” with the United States; those with “significant 
business or professional obligations”; close family members who are either lawful permanent residents or U.S. 
citizens; youth and those needing medical care; those employed by the government).
13  See supra note 3.
14  William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 Fla. L. Rev. 155, 185 (2019) (“[T]he Court’s 
animus jurisprudence has built upon the foundational statements of its discriminatory intent jurisprudence.”).
15  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-69 (1977).
16  Siegel, supra note 3 at 1134 (the court “continued to emphasize that plaintiffs might draw upon 
evidence of racial impact to prove a claim of discriminatory purpose” but after Feeney, the Court made clear 
that it had raised quite a formidable barrier to plaintiffs challenging facially neutral state action”); Haney-
López, supra note 3, at 1814 (“The rise of colorblindness and malicious intent, however, destroyed the capacity 
of equal protection to actually protect non-Whites. In this account, Davis and contextual intent more generally 
suffer the fate of victims. It is a sad indicia of how far equal protection has devolved, that the villain of the 
1970s is today’s honored dead.”).
17  See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1065, 1130 (1998) (noting that the 
“evidentiary” approach codified in Arlington Heights enables courts to more deftly tread the “fine line” between 
deference and scrutiny); Ian F. Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1779, 1809, 1814-15 
(2012) (arguing that, irrespective of what it and Davis have come to represent to both scholars and the Court 
itself, Arlington Heights “helpfully” established a framework through which “[c]ontextual intent” can aid 
courts’ efforts to discern racial discrimination). But cf. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 764 (arguing that “in Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Court defined “discriminatory purpose” so stringently that it 
made all the evidentiary bases enumerated in Arlington Heights, including disparate impact, almost irrelevant”).
18  See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197 (1976). See also infra notes 48-49 
and accompanying text.
19  See infra Part V.B (discussing the implications of process scrutiny in the context of novel or peripheral 
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One important advantage of a small-p process framework is that it is based less on 
substantive interpretations of value and intent—which can be highly contested and sub-
jective—and more on objective criteria grounded in the political branches’ own chosen 
practices. Yet even while process scrutiny offers powerful and revelatory indicators of 
governmental motivation, the theory also raises a number of concerns, including the 
risk of incentivizing or permitting an enacting body to camouflage other substantive 
deficiencies by simply meeting a bare minimum level of deliberation, setting the stage 
for evasion.20 While “good process” need not be quantifiable, it should be objectively 
measurable to generate accountability.21 
I. Small-p Process and Intent: Establishing  
a Baseline
A. The Relationship between Discriminatory Intent and Process Failure
Courts understandably face great anxiety around questions of political branch motiva-
tion that no single device—procedural or otherwise—can entirely dispel. A familiar but 
fundamental difficulty with identifying improper governmental intent is whether it is 
even possible to aggregate the thoughts and motives of individual officials to produce 
a single governmental intent. This problem has been vigorously and fruitfully argued, 
particularly with regard to legislative intent. Some scholars argue that such aggregation 
is sound in theory and workable in practice.22 Others argue by contrast that any attempt 
to discern legislative intent via aggregation is conceptually incoherent and thus doomed 
to failure.23 Ronald Dworkin, for instance, famously argued that even a preternaturally 
rights claims).
20  Cf. Dan T. Coenen, The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible “Semisubstantive” Constitutional 
Rules, 77 Fordham. L. Rev. 2835, 2839 (2009) (noting how procedural rulings allow for a situation in which 
“exactly the same law or practice that the Court had found objectionable would survive constitutional attack if 
political authorities, in a second go-round, avoided the initial process error”).
21  While this Article positions process scrutiny primarily as a tool to uncover hidden malintent in facially 
neutral equal protection cases, the theory has broader ambitions for constitutional law. First, process scrutiny 
appears to make a meaningful difference in cases involving unconstitutional takings (where intent is not 
recognized as a key doctrinal criterion), and has been instructive in analyzing the fit between means and ends 
in relevant cases where heightened scrutiny applies. The theory also has some overlap with “semi-substantive” 
constitutional theory, and it places “bilateral endorsement” theory in new light.
22  See, e.g., Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent 53 (2012) (providing an account of group 
intention as a collective expression of “we-intentions” held by individual legislators); see also Fallon, supra note 
1, at 537 (“Despite well-known questions about whether Congress as a collective body can possess intentions 
or purposes, there are circumstances under which courts might coherently ascribe a collective intent to the 
legislature based on the intentions or motivations of individual legislators.”); see also Dorf, supra note 1, at 
88-90 (arguing that Fallon’s analysis need not be limited to the legislative context, “as opposed to the broader 
relevance of intent in law”); see also Katherine Shaw, Speech, Intent, and the President, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 
__, 14-15 (2018) (observing that discerning illegitimate intent in the executive context should be much more 
straightforward as an evidentiary matter given the lack of aggregation and is in fact already routine in judicial 
review); but cf. Huq, supra note 1, at 1286 (arguing that discriminatory intent challenges lose force as the 
context shifts from legislative action to dispersed executive discretion, due in part to the case-by-case decisional 
approach characteristic of executive actors).
23  See Steven Douglas Smith, Against Civil Rights Simplism: How Not to Accommodate Competing 
Legal Commitments 7 (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 17-294, 2017), available at https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991883 (“arguments that centrally turn on ascriptions of animus 
to large classes of people are likely at best to vastly oversimplify a complex set of beliefs, perspectives, and 
motivations.”).
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gifted judge would run into insurmountable difficulties trying to discover the intent of 
a legislature.24 This divide is also reflected in federal court precedent,25 including the 
Supreme Court’s short-lived experiment to dispense with motivational analysis in con-
stitutional adjudication.26
The difficulties of engaging in an intent-based analysis are often compounded by the 
heavily fact-dependent nature of legislative intent. As Professor Richard Fallon has 
pointed out, legislative intent is a “protean concept,” inevitably colored by the partic-
ular fact pattern it inhabits.27 As a result, the judicial approach to identifying improper 
legislative intent is commonly described as inconsistent and problematic across different 
cases and contexts.28 Indeed, in Professor William Araiza’s phrase, the “epistemological 
difficulty [of deciphering intent] would seem to send a strong cautionary signal about 
widespread use of the animus idea.”29
Indeed, the presumption that one can know with certainty the internal attitudes, emo-
tions and biases of a single person, let alone a multi-member legislative body, places on 
judges, in all but the most flagrant instances, a demand to be mind-readers.30 Such a role 
imposes an impossible expectation fraught with numerous problems—requiring subjec-
tive judgment about the internal beliefs, attitudes, and intentions of others that exists 
outside a legislative or policy document; determining if the degree of influence of those 
divined attitudes and biases constitutes an intent to harm; and so forth. Furthermore, 
such an expectation demands that judges be indefensibly reductive—reducing not only 
an individual’s thoughts and attitudes to a single intent, but that of an entire legislative 
body. For these reasons, an objective approach, in which judicial review is couched in 
the broader context and process of a given policy, may provide courts with a useful lens 
that avoids resorting to entirely subjective impressions or a psychoanalysis of the minds 
of the lawmakers themselves.31 
24  See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 317-33 (1986) (detailing the struggles of determining which 
legislators’ intentions count, how these intentions combine, which mental states count as intentions, 
and how to deal with conflicting intentions); see also Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal 
Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1992) (“If legislative purpose is the mere aggregation 
of the motivations of individual legislation, then there seems to be no escaping the conclusion that the very 
idea of legislative purpose is incoherent.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a 
collective body.”).
25  See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1785, 1795-857 (2008) 
(providing an account of the growing acceptance over time of judicial inquiry into legislative purpose).
26  See infra note 51.
27  Fallon, supra note 1, at 553. 
28  See, e.g., Huq, supra note 1, at 1211 (arguing that the Supreme Court has not provided a “crisp, single 
definition of ‘discriminatory intent’ that applies across institutions and public policy contexts”); Fallon, supra 
note 1, at 528 (observing that the Supreme Court “has failed to settle on a single, intelligible conception of 
legislative intent”). 
29  Araiza, supra note 20, at 24-25.
30  See U.S. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) ( Jackson, J., concurring) (describing 
divining legislative intent from legislative history as “psychoanalysis of Congress” and being “handicapped 
in that weird endeavor” because the “process seems to [be] not interpretation of a statute but creation of a 
statute”); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with Justice Jackson’s characterization).
31  Cf. McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005) (warning against 
“judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts”).
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The theory of “process scrutiny” provides such a framework. On the one hand, process 
scrutiny draws on latent Supreme Court doctrine and related dicta reflecting the con-
stitutional salience of procedural regularity. On the other hand, process scrutiny breaks 
new ground by expanding the procedural mechanisms relevant to constitutional review, 
holding government institutions to their own standards (rather than generating them 
through the subjective impulses of individual jurists) while aiding courts to better ad-
dress forms of discrimination that are less visible or that go underground.
B. Process Scrutiny and the Court’s Intent Standard
1. Representation Reinforcement and Macro-Process
The connection between procedural scrutiny and governmental intent dates back to 
Justice Stone’s famous footnote four in Carolene Products, which notes how certain 
defects in the process of law-making may require stricter judicial scrutiny and a narrow-
ing of the usual presumption of constitutionality.32 Forty years later, the Warren Court’s 
process-oriented activism in fields such as criminal procedure, political expression, and 
equal protection inspired John Hart Ely’s seminal exposition of the ideas modestly ad-
vanced in Carolene Products.33 Ely drew on Carolene Products to describe the Equal 
Protection Clause as a mechanism to vindicate macro-level process—namely, access to 
relevant political institutions allowing groups to take part in the benefits of representa-
tive government.34 In Democracy and Distrust, Ely offered a methodical account of how 
the Constitution is “overwhelmingly dedicated to concerns of process and structure and 
not to the identification and preservation of specific substantive values.”35 This meant 
that the Court should be concerned with participation, not on identifying and vindicat-
ing substantive norms. When the political process has been restricted in some way, the 
Court must intervene to unclog the channels of access.36 
Although Ely believed that heightened judicial scrutiny would effectively smoke out 
improper legislative motivation,37 his theory does not provide much clarity regarding 
32  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court indicated three categories of 
legislation that might require more robust judicial intervention: legislation that facially falls within a specific 
constitutional prohibition; legislation restricting political processes that cause undesirable legislation to be 
repealed; and legislation curtailing political processes relied upon to protect discrete and insular minorities. See 
id. at 152 n.4. See also Ely, supra note 4, at 73-75.
33  Ely found in the Warren Court’s constitutional decisions a “deep structure” that was neither clause-
bound nor value-oriented, but instead “participational.” Ely, supra note 4, at 73-75. For Ely, these decisions 
evinced two main concerns: “clearing the channels of political change” and “correcting certain kinds of 
discrimination against minorities.” Id.
34  Ely, supra note 4, at 74-75.
35  Id. at 92. Ely links this constitutional commitment to process in paragraphs two and three of Carolene 
Products’ famous footnote four. The second paragraph suggests that the appropriate function of the Court is 
“to make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept open.” Id. at 76. The third 
paragraph “suggests that the Court should also concern itself with what majorities do to minorities.” Id. Ely 
thinks these two concerns fit together and demonstrate the principal concern of the Warren Court: that 
everyone have access to the political process to take part in the benefits of representative government. Id. at 
74-75.
36  Id. at 77.
37  Ely cautions against looking to lawmakers’ motivations in cases of outright constitutional violations 
because in those cases the constitutional violation is enough to warrant striking down the legislation regardless 
of the motivations of the lawmakers. Thus, he argues that judicial exploration of lawmakers’ motivations is only 
appropriate when there is a claim that a “constitutionally gratuitous” benefit has been improperly withheld. 
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the appropriate use of that level of scrutiny. He argues that heightened scrutiny is war-
ranted only when a law burdens a “suspect classification”38 and that the real linchpin for 
determining suspect classifications should be the presence of prejudice.39 Yet he does not 
explain how a court would know whether a given law is founded on prejudice in the first 
place. This is a problem because lawmakers have the ability to hide improper motiva-
tion behind facially neutral laws, and Ely’s conception of representation reinforcement 
is not geared toward uncovering forms of discrimination that go underground or are 
otherwise hard to see. The same problem concerns discrimination against “new” equal 
protection claimants: notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s reluctance to afford 
heightened scrutiny to additional categories of individuals,40 legislatures remain adept at 
finding seemingly neutral ways to target various underrepresented groups.41 
2. Due Process of Lawmaking and Micro-Process
Four years before Ely famously emphasized the Constitution’s role in guarding the ac-
cessibility of the political process, the eminent Judge and scholar Hans Linde penned a 
seminal article taking a narrower view of judicial review of legislative process. Linde was 
quite critical of the ideas expressed in Carolene Products that would later form the basis 
of Ely’s representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review,42 and he instead focused on 
a set of smaller-scale, micro-level procedures to inform his conception of a Due Process 
of Lawmaking. Linde argued that certain deliberative mechanisms, such as the consider-
ation of evidence, attending committee meetings, or reading a bill before casting a vote 
should not be amenable to judicial review.43 On the other hand, he argued that other 
Id. at 145. In cases “where what is denied is something [to which] the claimant has a constitutional right—
because it is granted explicitly by the terms of the Constitution or is essential to the effective functioning of a 
democratic government (or both)—the reasons it was denied are irrelevant.” Id. 
38  Id. at 145–46.
39  Id. at 153.
40  See Yoshino, supra note 3, at 756–57 (“Litigants still argue that new classifications should receive 
heightened scrutiny. Yet these attempts have an increasingly antiquated air in federal constitutional litigation, 
as the last classification accorded heightened scrutiny by the Supreme Court was that based on nonmarital 
parentage in 1977. At least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence, this canon has closed.”); 
Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 887, 897 (“Access to heightened scrutiny 
is generally foreclosed, as the Court has expressed great reluctance to acknowledge new suspect classifications, 
quasi-suspect classifications, or fundamental rights.”).
41  One clear example of this concerns “bathroom bans” aimed at preventing transgender individuals from 
accessing public restrooms corresponding to their gender identity, many of which were passed in the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s decision upholding the freedom to marry for gays and lesbians in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015), see Richard Socarides, North Carolina and the Gay-Rights Backlash, New Yorker (Mar. 
28, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/north-carolina-and-the-gay-rights-backlash; see also 
Past LGBT Nondiscrimination and Anti-LGBT Bills Across the Country, ACLU (2016), https://www.aclu.
org/other/past-lgbt-nondiscrimination-and-anti-lgbt-bills-across-country (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). In the 
case of North Carolina’s Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, ch. 3, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws (repealed 2017) 
(commonly referred to as “HB2”) (repealed 2017), while the governor and legislators who supported it stated 
a concern about keeping sexual predators out of women’s bathrooms, the text of the bill itself reveals no such 
legislative purpose, with transgender identity, bathroom safety and privacy nowhere mentioned in the text 
of the act. Amanda Wilcox, Five Things to Know about North Carolina’s House Bill 2, PBS (May 26, 2016), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/2016/05/five-things-to-know-about-north-carolinas-house-bill-2/. 
This decision to avoid any explicit naming of the affected group appears intended to circumvent Supreme 
Court decisions rooting out governmental efforts to single out particular groups for unfavorable treatment, as 
established in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
42  See generally, Linde, supra note 24. 
43  Id. at 224-27.
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processes of lawmaking—such as rules governing the qualifications of legislators, terms 
of office, reapportionment and voting and quorum requirements imposed by constitu-
tions or internal mandates—strike at the very heart of a conception of “due process” 
that should matter greatly to courts.44 
While The Due Process of Lawmaking did not draw any connection between procedur-
al or deliberative rigor on the one hand and legislative motivation on the other, Supreme 
Court decisions shortly thereafter began to establish that very connection by linking 
unconstitutional motivation with procedural regularity. After a brief period in the early 
1970s when the Supreme Court appeared to dispense with intent-based inquiries alto-
gether in constitutional analysis,45 motivational analysis soon took center stage in major 
constitutional interpretations of equal protection.46 These subsequent decisions focused 
less on the kind of deliberative and participatory failures Ely had in mind, and more on 
a set of small-p processes drawn from commonly used lawmaking procedures. The result 
was an important, if incomplete, doctrinal relationship between procedural deviation 
and governmental motivation.
II. The Hidden Legacy of Arlington Heights
The connection between small-p process failure and improper motivation finds im-
portant expression in the “discriminatory intent” cases of the 1970s. When the Court 
in Washington v. Davis47 established that the disparate racial impact of a law or policy 
would generally not, without more, trigger the exacting scrutiny applied to explicit clas-
sifications, it was not completely blind to the difficulty its intent standard might place 
on equal protection litigators. Thus, Davis allows Courts to infer an improper moti-
vation from the surrounding circumstances and context of a given governmental act.48 
The Court’s “totality of the . . . facts” language has effectively left an open door to more 
substantial methods of scrutiny than ephemeral attempts to divine the intent of govern-
ment actors.49 
44  Id. at 240-42. Linde recognized, however, that the judicial remedy for such violations raised difficult 
questions. Id. at 247.
45  Five years before Washington v. Davis clarified that a requirement of purposeful discrimination 
would be necessary to trigger heightened scrutiny, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (discussed infra notes 
53-55 and accompanying text), the Supreme Court appeared to reject an intent-based analysis. In Palmer v. 
Thompson, the Court endorsed the decision of the City of Jackson, Mississippi, to shut down all of its public 
swimming pools rather than integrate them under a desegregation order. 403 U.S. 217, 221 (1971). The 
City’s obvious discriminatory purpose meant that neither black nor white individuals would be able to access 
public swimming pools. Because the Court distanced itself from an interpretive approach based on legislative 
motivation, “[l]ower courts . . . assumed plausibly, though not inevitably, that the Court had opted instead 
for the impact theory of equal protection.” Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal 
Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 297 (1991). 
46  See supra note 2.
47  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48  Id. at 242 (“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the 
totality of the relevant facts, including [that] the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is 
also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact. . . may for all practical purposes demonstrate 
unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial 
grounds.”).
49  Id.
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A. Arlington Heights’ Quiet Strain of Proceduralism
One year after Davis was decided, the Court drew on the intent standard in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, sustaining a 
town’s denial of a proposed rezoning effort that would produce racially integrated hous-
ing units.50 Although the Court refused to accept the disproportionate racial impact of 
a law or policy as tantamount to an express racial classification, Justice Powell affirmed 
Davis’s recognition that the Court should examine the “totality” of the facts to infer 
motivation from the surrounding circumstances and context of a given governmental 
act. Indeed, Powell developed that idea further, noting that the judicial inquiry into 
motivation “demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence 
of intent as may be available,” with a range of considerations that could be probative of 
discriminatory intent:
. . . .The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, partic-
ularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. . . . The 
specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision also may shed 
some light on the decision-maker’s purposes. . . . Departures from the normal 
procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are 
playing a role. Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the 
factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a de-
cision contrary to the one reached. . . . The legislative or administrative history 
may be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by 
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports. . . .51
Powell’s non-exhaustive list52 of procedural factors, non-procedural factors, and others 
that fall somewhere in between provides a clear invitation for courts to examine govern-
ment process as part of an intent-based inquiry into constitutionally suspect government 
action. Among the various features of Powell’s test, one stands out as affirmatively invit-
ing a baseline procedural analysis: that “departures from normal procedur[e] [] might 
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.”53 Indeed, the centrality of 
that factor has become apparent, as courts in a variety of contexts have relied on small-p 
process to ferret out improper motivation.
1. Arlington Heights’ Application in the Voter ID Cases
The procedural features of Powell’s framework have been highly influential in a recent 
number of voter identification decisions. While the cases raise evident concerns about 
the very exclusionary practices that were of concern to Ely,54 courts have routinely resort-
ed to an analysis of small-p process to strike down the laws in question. Two recent cases, 
50  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 256.
51  Id. at 267-68 (emphases added).
52  Id. at 268 (noting that the list of “subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially 
discriminatory intent existed” did not “purport[] to be exhaustive”).
53  Id.
54  Ely, supra note 4, at 117-24. 
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N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory55 and Veasey v. Abbott,56 illustrate 
that the possibility of meaningful judicial review still exists, despite courts’ difficulty ac-
tualizing certain aspects of representation reinforcement. The decisions are remarkable 
for how they link motivational inquiry with the kinds of process concerns that Powell 
identified in Arlington Heights. 
a. NAACP and Small-p Process
After Shelby County v. Holder invalidated the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance 
regime,57 states unleashed punishing new voter ID restrictions58 that were challenged on 
both statutory and constitutional grounds.59 In North Carolina, the legislature abruptly 
passed an “omnibus” voting reform law60 that reduced the list of acceptable forms of 
photo identification for in-person voting,61 eliminated same-day registration and pre-
registration for individuals age 16 and 17,62 reduced the number of early voting days 
from 17 to ten,63 and scrapped a provisional voting process for out-of-precinct voting.64 
In North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, the Fourth Circuit, apply-
ing Arlington Heights, permanently enjoined the challenged provisions as intentionally 
discriminatory under both section 2 of the Voting Rights Act65 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.66 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged substantive concerns about racial discrimination 
and voter disenfranchisement, incuding “the inextricable link between race and politics 
in North Carolina”67 and the legislature’s curious interest in addressing voter fraud at 
the very moment when African-American voter turnout in North Carolina was, after 
decades of setbacks, finally reaching near-parity with that of the white population.68 
55  831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
56  830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612.
57  133 S. Ct 2612, 2651 (2013). Shelby County officially retired the formula previously used to determine 
which districts required preclearance under the Voting Rights Act and freed many states and counties from 
having to submit proposed changes in voting laws to the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel. 
58  Anthony J. Gaughan, Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and 
Partisan Election Administration, 12 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 90 (2017) (noting that Shelby County 
“clear[ed] the way for partisan legislatures in the South…to reassert their control over voting rules”); Mark 
Rush, The Current State of Election Law in the United States, 23 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 383, 
409-10 (2017) (explaining that Shelby County “unleashed state legislatures to restrict access to polling stations 
on Election Day”).
59  Carroll Rhodes, Federal Appellate Courts Push Back Against States’ Voter Suppression Laws, 85 Miss. 
L.J. 1227, 1248 (2017) (explaining how the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have invalidated voter suppression 
laws that were enacted on the heels of Shelby County).
60  Voter Information Verification Act, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 1505 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of N.C. Gen. Stat.). 
61  See N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 216 (4th Cir. 2016).
62  See id. at 217-18.
63  See id. at 217.
64  See id.
65  Pub. L. No. 89-110, §2, 79 Stat. 437, 437–38 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §10301(a)).
66  NAACP, 831 F.3d at 219, 241.
67  Id. at 214. Judge Motz, writing for the court, noted that voting in North Carolina had become so 
“racially polarized,” with different races traditionally voting for different political parties, that it was possible 
for members of the legislature to enact laws “targeting [racial] groups unlikely to vote for them.” Id. See also 
id. at 226 (noting that “contextual facts, which reveal the powerful undercurrents influencing North Carolina 
politics, must be considered in determining why the General Assembly enacted [the legislation]”).
68  See id. at 214, 226 (“[T]he General Assembly enacted [the rules] in the immediate aftermath of 
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Indeed, there were important indications of invidious intent in NAACP—in partic-
ular, the legislature’s peculiar request for, and use of, racial data for the sole purpose of 
disenfranchising African-American voters.69 For example, although the original bill 
permitted the use of all government-issued identification, when the racial data revealed 
that African Americans were less likely to possess certain types of identification, the 
legislature amended the new bill to permit only those types of identification African 
Americans carried less frequently.70 When lawmakers learned that African Americans 
predominantly utilized early voting procedures, the legislature shortened early voting 
by a week.71 The law also limited same-day registration and out-of-province voting, two 
mechanisms the district court found were also utilized disproportionately by African 
Americans.72 
Nevertheless, the court gave significant weight to small-p process as part of its painstak-
ing application of the Arlington Heights factors. Noting how “‘[d]epartures from the 
normal procedural sequence’ may demonstrate “that improper purposes are playing a 
role,” the Fourth Circuit concluded that the trial court “erred in refusing to draw the 
obvious inference that th[e] sequence of events signals discriminatory intent.”73 
Indeed, examples of “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” were rife. First 
was the issue of timing: the voter ID provisions were announced the day after Shelby 
County removed the very preclearance requirement that would have likely prevented 
those provisions from becoming law.74 The Fourth Circuit saw this as suspicious under 
Arlington Heights’ instruction to consider the “specific sequence of events leading up to 
the challenged decision.”75 Furthermore, rather than introduce the voting rules as part 
of a new, stand-alone bill, the General Assembly simply tacked them onto existing legis-
lation that already bore the features of ordinary law, “swiftly expand[ing] an essentially 
single-issue bill into omnibus legislation”—a clear departure from procedural norms.76 
While the pre-Shelby County version of the bill received three weeks of public debate 
and had even garnered some bipartisan support, that bill sat dormant for two months 
while Shelby County loomed. The General Assembly did not revisit the bill until the 
Court excised the preclearance procedure from the Voting Rights Act.77 The new 
post-Shelby County bill was three times as long as the original bill78 and “rushed . . . 
through the legislative process”79 without being marked up by a committee80—again, a 
unprecedented African American voter participation in a state with a troubled racial history and racially 
polarized voting.”). The court also explained that well over 85% of African Americans voted for Democratic 
candidates in the two previous presidential elections. See id. at 226.
69  See id. at 216-18.
70  See id. at 216.
71  See id.
72  See id. at 217-18.
73  Id. at 227 (internal citations omitted). 
74  See id. at 214. 
75  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
76  NAACP, 831 F.3d at 216.
77  Id.
78  Id.
79  Id. at 228.
80  Id.
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clear indication of procedurally anomalous conduct. The court went on to observe that 
“neither this legislature—nor, as far as we can tell, any other legislature in the Country—
has ever done so much, so fast, to restrict access to the franchise.”81 Thus, while there 
were undoubtedly clear markers of race-based motivation, unusual procedural circum-
stances played a critical role in aiding the court’s awareness of legislative intent. 
b. Veasey and Small-p Process
In Veasey v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit linked small-p process with improper motivation 
in striking down a pre-Shelby County voter ID law known as Senate Bill 14 (“SB-14”)82 
that prohibited many standard forms of identification permitted in other states.83 The 
Fifth Circuit did not ignore substantive concerns such as Texas’s history of all-white pri-
maries, literacy tests, secret ballots, and poll taxes,84 yet it deemed those practices too 
distant to evince improper intent within the current law.85 On the other hand, where 
small-p process was concerned, “numerous and radical procedural departures [gave] cre-
dence to an inference of discriminatory intent.”86 These included: 
(1) getting special permission to file the bill under a low number reserved for 
the Lieutenant Governor’s legislative priorities; (2) Governor Perry’s decision 
to designate the bill as emergency legislation so that it could be considered 
during the first sixty days of the legislative session; (3) suspending the two-
thirds rule regarding the number of votes required to make SB-14 a “special 
order”; (4) allowing the bill to bypass the ordinary committee process in the 
Texas House and Senate; (5) passing SB-14 with an unverified $2 million fiscal 
note despite the prohibition on doing so in the 2011 legislative session due to 
a $27 million budget shortfall; (6) cutting debate short to enable a three-day 
passage through the Senate; and (7) passing resolutions to allow the confer-
ence committee to add provisions to SB-14, contrary to the Legislature’s rules 
and normal practice. . . . 87
The court was equally troubled by the legislature’s decision, despite its awareness of the 
disproportionate impact the law would have on historically marginalized groups, to 
81  Id. at 228.
82  See Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
83  SB-14 as deemed was deemed the “strictest” voting law in the country. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 
3d 627, 642 (S.D. Tex. 2014), aff ’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 
216 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Veasey v. Abbott, Campaign Legal Center, http://www.campaignlegalcenter.
org/case/veasey-v-abbott-0 (last updated April 27, 2018). Under SB-14, for example, one may not use state 
identification from a state other than Texas, public assistance identification, student identification, or any 
federal government identification not enumerated in the law. See Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 642 (listing the 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of ID under SB-14).
84  The initial district judge found the law was enacted with discriminatory purpose, Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 
at 633, and the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, largely sustained that ruling. Veasey, 830 F.3d at 272 (remanding 
certain aspects of the lower court’s analysis for clarification).
85  Veasey, 830 F.3d at 232. The court also found that the more recent instances of discrimination cited in 
the district court record were simply less probative of an intent by the legislature to discriminate. Id. at 233.
86  Id. at 238.
87  Id. at 238 (citations omitted). The court went on to note that these procedural oddities were only 
present with regard to SB-14; none of the other pressing legislative initiatives such exceptional treatment. See 
id.
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reject additional proposals to curb that impact. Tying this observation to small-p pro-
cess, the Court noted that the law’s proponents “largely refused to explain the rejection 
of those amendments,”88 something that “was out of character for sponsors of major 
bills.”89 These procedural irregularities contributed to the Fifth Circuit sustaining the 
lower court’s finding of improper motivation.90 
Veasey is a powerful example of how process scrutiny can shore up gaps in traditional in-
tent doctrine. A pure “intent” analysis would have been insufficient under Davis and its 
progeny because of the difficulty proving that the legislature acted “because of, and not 
merely in spite of,” the disproportionate impact.91 Still, the Court could draw on the vast 
procedural irregularities of SB-14 to help surface the underlying discriminatory intent. 
2. Beyond Arlington Heights: Process Scrutiny and Judicial Invalidation
In addition to NAACP and Veasey, lower courts have drawn on small-p process con-
cerns to allow suits to proceed beyond preliminary stages of litigation and even enjoin 
policies concerning school desegregation,92 fair housing and land use,93 the dormant 
commerce clause,94 and electoral redistricting and allocation of public benefits.95 Those 
courts have invoked Arlington Heights’ multi-factor test, finding improper motive 
based on a lack of procedural regularity in government decision-making. For example, 
an Arizona district court recently set aside a facially neutral state law that prohibited eth-
nic studies courses by finding the policy’s enactment and enforcement to be motivated 
by discrimination.96 In addition to derogatory statements made by legislators, the court 
88  Id. at 237.
89  Id. (citations omitted).
90  Id. at 239. NAACP and Veasey reveal a related point about process failure and improper motivation 
that is worthy of mention. In both cases, the courts were explicit that any purportedly legitimate justification 
for a problem that the court concludes is fabricated quickly loses legs, creating the space for a finding of 
improper motivation. In NAACP, for example, the Fourth Circuit accused the North Carolina legislature of 
manufacturing a phony narrative for its voter ID law, “impos[ing] cures for problems that [do] not exist,” 831 
F.3d at 214, while in Veasey, the Fifth Circuit called out the legislature for ignoring its procedures for the sake 
of addressing an “almost nonexistent problem.” 830 F.3d at 239. For a sustained treatment of the relationship 
between nonexistent problems and judicial review of legislation, see Joseph Landau, Broken Records: 
Reconceptualizing Rational Basis Review to Address “Alternative Facts” in the Legislative Process, 73 Vand. L. 
Rev. __ (forthcoming 2020). 
91  See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring a showing that 
the government acted “because of, not merely in spite of ” discriminatory impact to apply heightened scrutiny 
to facially neutral government action).
92  See Stout ex rel. Stout v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.3d 988 (11th Cir. 2018).
93  See Ave. 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 509 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 295 (2016); Pac. Shores Properties, LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1162 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, FL, 529 F.3d 1027, 1044 (11th Cir. 2008); Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, No. 3:14-CV-3013-D, 2016 WL 6397643, (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 28, 2016); MHANY Mgmt. Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), 
aff ’d sub nom. Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016); Hidden Vill., LLC v. City 
of Lakewood, Ohio, 867 F. Supp. 2d 920 (N.D. Ohio 2012), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 734 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 
2013); Church of Scientology of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1376 (N.D. 
Ga. 2012).
94  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, No. 1:15-CV-134-RP, 2018 WL 
1404409 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2018).
95  See, e.g., Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
96  See Gonzalez v. Douglas, 269 F. Supp. 3d 948 (D. Ariz. 2017). The Tucson Unified School District’s 
Mexican-American Studies program was borne out of a desegregation decree and aimed to engage Mexican-
American students in their schoolwork by highlighting aspects of Mexican-American history and culture. Id. 
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relied on irregularities in the process of enactment.97 Beyond evidence of discriminato-
ry intent in enactment, the court pointed to procedural irregularities—such as reliance 
on one-sided investigations—as evidence of discriminatory intent in enforcement.98 In 
separate litigation challenging an Alabama voter ID law, a federal district court looked 
to procedural irregularity—that, among other things, the time for debating the bill had 
been severely constrained—as sufficient evidence of discriminatory motive to survive a 
motion to dismiss.99 Finally, in challenges to newly enacted electoral maps, departures 
from normal procedures in the events prior to enactment—including intentional con-
straints on debate and violations of rules for public hearings—was sufficient for a Texas 
district court to find that the City of Pasadena had enacted an unconstitutional electoral 
map with a discriminatory intent to dilute Latino votes.100
B. Process Scrutiny and Legislative Vindication
Process scrutiny works in two directions: While courts can treat with greater scrutiny 
legislative acts that undermine well-established procedures, they might also give leeway 
to otherwise suspect policy choices that are the result of thorough vetting and sound pro-
cesses. Indeed, Washington v. Davis itself conceivably stands as an example.101 Although 
the challenged entrance exam for applicants to the D.C. Police Department had a dispa-
rate racial impact on African-American applicants, the police force had made extensive 
efforts to diversify.102 Not only did the police force make “affirmative efforts . . . to recruit 
black officers,”103 but record evidence supported the government’s claim that the exam 
was directly related to the training needs and requirements of the police force.104 Indeed, 
the extensive expert testimony fleshed out a relatively robust small-p process. In briefing, 
Corporation Counsel relied on studies by numerous experts to support the claim that 
the entrance exam was a reasonable, impartial, and objective predictive tool to establish 
the ability to be trained. This included a study by the U.S. Civil Service Commission and 
affidavits from research psychologists and other educational testing experts.105 Other au-
thorities bolstered that evidence by noting the “need for police recruits to possess the 
verbal ability to be trained which [the challenged test] is designed to measure.”106 Given 
at 950-51. When Tucson school officials tried to end the program, the court held that Arizona school officials 
acted with racial animus. Id. at 973; see also Arce v. Douglas, 793 F.3d 968, 981 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding 
that there is “sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the enactment and/
or enforcement of [the state law] § 15–112 here challenged was motivated, at least in part, by an intent to 
discriminate against [] students on the basis of their race or national origin”). 
97  See Gonzalez, 269 F. Supp 3d at 965-68.
98  Id. at 968-70. 
99  See Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ala. 2017). However 
the defendant, Secretary of State John Merrill, did ultimately prevail against the plaintiff ’s constitutional claims 
on his motion for summary judgment. See Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 
1279 (N.D. Ala. 2018).
100  Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
101  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
102  Id. at 235 (noting that the D.C. Police Department “had systematically and affirmatively sought 
to enroll black officers” and that “44% of new police force recruits had been black” in the years immediately 
preceding the litigation.
103  Id. at 246.
104  Id. at 251. 
105  Walter E. Washington, et al., Petitioners, v. Alfred E. Davis, et al., Respondents., 1975 WL 173557 
(U.S.), 6.
106  Id. at 18. The authorities cited are judicial and administrative, including observations from 
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this broader context—bearing little to no trace of irregularity, and in which the plain-
tiffs affirmatively disclaimed any allegation of discriminatory motivation107—the Court 
concluded that the “changing racial composition of the recruit classes and of the force 
in general, and the relationship of the test to the training program negated any inference 
that the Department discriminated on the basis of race or that a police officer qualifies 
on the color of his skin rather than ability.”108 
The 1981 case Rostker v. Goldberg also illustrates the vindicating potential of small-p 
process.109 Rostker upheld the constitutionality of an all-male selective service policy 
under heightened scrutiny.110 The Court rested heavily on Congress’s considerable de-
liberations,111 including robust debate over female inclusion through “extensive[] . . . 
hearings, floor debate, and in committee.”112 Based on those rigorous procedures, the 
Court satisfied itself that the resulting act was not a product of outmoded or “‘tradition-
al way[s] of thinking about females.’”113 Importantly, Rostker did not defer flatly to the 
military’s judgment on matters of personnel; rather, the Court scaled deference based 
on its assessment of procedural rigor—namely “how the political branches [] made the 
policy choice at issue.”114 
* * *
As these cases demonstrate, process scrutiny can help resolve questions about 
underlying legislative motivation where both race-conscious and facially neu-
tral measures are concerned. The range of cases indicates the utility of process 
scrutiny within constitutional adjudication more generally. While the breadth 
of application leads to a host of institutional and normative considerations 
the Executive Director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and reports by the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Id. at 19-21.
107  426 U.S. at 251.
108  Davis, 426 U.S at 247 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
109  453 U.S. 57 (1981).
110  Id. at 69.
111  Id. at 72-74.
112  Id. The Court elaborated on the extent of hearings within both chambers of Congress, noting 
in particular how the Senate “defeated, after extensive debate, an amendment which in effect would have 
authorized the registration of women.” Id.
113  Id. at 74. These extensive deliberations gave the Court confidence that Congress was not acting 
“unthinkingly or reflexively and not for any considered reason.” Id. at 72-74 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199, 222-23 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)). In Califano, the court held that “a rule which effects an 
unequal distribution of economic benefits solely on the basis of sex” was grounded in “habit” or an “automatic 
reflex” regarding traditional gender norms “rather than analysis or actual reflection.” Califano, 430 U.S. at 222-
23.
114  See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2188, 2260 (2018). 
Indeed, after Rostker, a number of lower courts upheld the U.S. military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy 
regarding gay, lesbian, and bisexual servicemembers by noting the political branches’ “extensive examination” 
of the policy they later adopted. See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F. 3d 915, 922 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). This 
included a military working group, a commissioned study by the RAND Corporation, as well as “regular 
consultations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and leaders of each service, . . . [close study of ] the history of the 
military’s response to social change, and consult[ation] [with] legal experts.” Renan, supra, at 2261. These 
“exhaustive efforts of the democratically accountable branches of American government,” the court of appeals 
stressed, “is precisely [why] they deserve judicial respect.” Thomasson, 80 F. 3d at 923. Although these decisions 
turned on deference to the Executive, rather than to Congress, in the context of military affairs, the Court gives 
substantial weight to either of the political branches, provided it demonstrates a sound process. 
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taken up in Parts IV and V, respectively, the next Part explores how, in the 
context of executive branch action, a similar relationship exists between proce-
dural rigor (or lack thereof ) and policy vindication (or lack thereof ). 
III. Executive Branch Process and  
Discriminatory Intent
The connections between procedural regularity and malintent are not limited to the 
legislative context. Indeed, Arlington Heights specifically applied its small-p analysis to 
the administrative context,115 and the same relationship between governmental process-
es and judicial review can be found in judicial review of executive action—especially 
presidential action largely exempt from APA review.116 In the following case studies, 
which involve national security and immigration policy as well as military personnel 
policy—areas of exclusive or nearly exclusive executive power117—small-p process plays 
a remarkably important role in the scaling of judicial review. 
A. Small-p Process and the Trump Travel Ban
The relationship between small-p process and executive motivation has been important 
in the judicial rulings surrounding President Trump’s immigration-related executive ac-
tions that bar entry to individuals from a range of Muslim-majority countries.118 While 
115  Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (“legislative or 
administrative history”).
116  While the APA triggers rigorous procedural requirements and judicial review mechanisms for 
most ordinary forms of agency action, it generally does not reach presidential action. See generally Adrian 
Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095 (2009) (noting the myriad of ways, 
under statute and case law, that presidential functions are largely exempt from the purview of the judicial 
review mechanism of administrative law); id. at 1108 (“[T]he Supreme Court has twice stated that the 
President is not an agency” subject to the APA). Yet, even as scholars have argued that judicial review of 
executive branch behavior tends to be largely deferential and that, in any event, the inherent flexibility within 
administrative law allows (if not requires) courts to tone down review where presidential action is concerned, 
see id. at 1136 (focusing on national security and related emergencies); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1170 (2007), 1200-01 (highlighting judicial deference to the 
executive in foreign relations), executive action is not immune to process scrutiny, see infra Part III.A-C. In that 
regard, judicial review of executive action under the Constitution merges with the more conventional, process-
based mechanisms through which the APA allows courts to oversee discretionary agency decisions on both 
process- and substance-based grounds. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law As Constitutional 
Common Law, 110 Colum L. Rev. 479, 483 (2010) (“Administrative law is generally understood as having 
constitutional as well as what I will call “ordinary law” components[,] . . . . [and] constitutional concerns 
permeate ordinary administrative law, in particular doctrines of judicial review of agency action.”); see also 
Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision 
Making, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2070 (2011) (noting that “common staples of administrative law are relevant to 
constitutional decision making” while discussing hard look review under the APA).
117  See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (holding that the 
Court will defer to the “plenary and exclusive power of the President . . . in the field of international relations”); 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (holding that when the President exercises delegated power to 
make “rules for exclusion of aliens” for “a facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” the court will not question it 
or balance it against other constitutionally protected interests); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent 
in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 162 (2002) (“[T]he United States regularly maintains, and the courts frequently 
agree, that federal immigration laws should be subject to little or no judicial review . . . .”).
118  See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 ( Jan. 27, 2017) (first iteration); Exec. Order No. 
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (second iteration); Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 
24, 2017) (third iteration). 
LANDAU    |     47
most commentators frame the travel ban litigation through the President’s repeated 
expressions of hostility against the Muslim faith,119 courts at all levels of the federal ju-
diciary have tended to scale deference based on their impression of the strength—or 
weakness—of small-p procedures. In the lower courts, judges repeatedly linked process 
failure with constitutional infirmity. By contrast, the Supreme Court credited good 
process as a basis for deference. The more the government could show its policy was 
thoroughly vetted, the less the President’s disparaging remarks about Islam seemed to 
matter.120 Trump v. Hawaii thus provides an object lesson in the way judges link small-p 
process with Executive deference. 
1. Travel Bans 1.0 and 2.0: Process and Executive Invalidation
President Trump issued his travel ban seven days after taking office. Within days of the 
initial rollout,121 judges immediately entered temporary restraining orders prohibiting 
its enforcement.122 These early cases, which were upheld by the federal courts of ap-
peal,123 drew a number of connections between intent and small-p process, including the 
absence of “expert agencies with broad experience on the matters” and “no evidence that 
. . . a deliberative process took place.”124 In addition to those procedural irregularities, 
119  As Noah Feldman argued shortly after the ban was announced, when it comes to “President 
Donald Trump’s travel ban, there’s one word you need to focus on: animus.” Noah Feldman, Key Word for 
Travel Ban is ‘Animus’, Bloomberg View ( June 4, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/
articles/2017-06-04/key-word-for-travel-ban-at-supreme-court-is-animus; see also David Cole, Trump’s 
Travel Bans—Look Beyond the Text, The New York Review of Books (May 11, 2017), http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/2017/05/11/trumps-travel-bans-look-beyond-the-text/ (arguing that the travel ban has “taught 
Americans, and their judges, to be at once more skeptical of executive power and more solicitous of the rights 
of noncitizens.”). Donald Trump first mentioned the travel ban during a press conference while campaigning 
for President in 2015: “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering 
the United States . . .” Ryan Teague Beckwith, President Trump’s Own Word Keep Hurting His Travel Ban, 
Time (Mar. 16, 2017), http://time.com/4703614/travel-ban-judges-donald-trump-words/. In a series of 
subsequent statements about the proposed ban, candidate Trump said, “I think Islam hates us,” “we’re having 
problems with Muslims coming into the country,” “I’m talking territory instead of Muslim,” and “The Muslim 
ban is something that in some form has morphed into [an] extreme vetting from certain areas of the world.” 
Alan Gomez, What President Trump Has Said About the Travel Ban, USA Today ( June 11, 2017 10:42 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/11/what-president-trump-has-said-about-muslims-
travel-ban/102565166/. 
120  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393, 2418 (2018).
121  Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 ( Jan. 27, 2017). The first iteration suspended refugee 
admissions for 120 days, indefinitely suspended the admission of Syrian refugees, and banned the immigrant 
and nonimmigrant entry of nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Id.
122  See Aziz v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-116, 2017 WL 386549, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2017) 
(“respondents are forbidden from removing petitioners—lawful permanent residents at Dulles International 
Airport—for a period of 7 days from the issuance of this Order.”); Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CIV. 480 
(AMD), 2017 WL 388504, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (“petitioners have a strong likelihood of success in 
establishing that the removal of the petitioner and others similarly situated violates their rights to Due Process 
and Equal Protection”); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 
3, 2017) (“the court finds that the States have met their burden of demonstrating that they face immediate and 
irreparable injury as a result of the signing and implementation of the Executive Order.”). 
123  See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (“The Government has not shown 
that the Executive Order provides what due process requires, such as notice and a hearing prior to restricting an 
individual’s ability to travel.”); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724, 736 (E.D. Va. 2017) (The Commonwealth 
is likely to succeed on its Establishment Clause claim because it produced evidence that the travel ban was 
motivated by religious animus). 
124  Aziz, 234 F. Supp. 3d. at 736; see also id. (contrary to the ordinary expected rollout of an order 
of this magnitude and significance, “there is evidence that the president’s senior national security officials were 
taken by surprise”).
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courts noted the “highly particular ‘sequence of events,’” including efforts by President 
Trump and his surrogates to find “legal” bases to ban Muslims from entering the coun-
try, as reason to block the policy.125
The Trump Administration revoked its order in response to these early rulings and made 
a number of modifications,126 yet, as with the first iteration, courts continued to cite 
process flaws as evidence of malintent. In one major case, the Fourth Circuit emphasized 
the procedural defect of excluding national security agencies from the decision-making 
process,127 the post hoc nature of the national security rationale, as well as government 
evidence that undermined the very effectiveness of the President’s policy.128 Within 
these initial cases, the concepts of process failure and unconstitutional motivation were 
closely linked.129 
2. Travel Ban 3.0: Process and Executive Vindication
The Trump Administration’s third version of the travel ban, issued via presidential 
proclamation,130 took pains to address the lower courts’ concerns about small-p pro-
cess.131 Government lawyers repeatedly touted a “worldwide” process that involved close 
125  Id. at 737 (granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on their Establishment Clause claims). 
Courts also took issue with other procedural oddities, such as the administration’s abrupt reversal on whether 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs) were subject to the same travel restrictions as all other nationals from the 
designated countries. One court rejected the government’s effort to invoke a post-hoc White House counsel 
interpretation to cure due process concerns raised by a rule restricting entry to LPRs. The court refused to 
accept the government’s about-face regarding LPRs when it “offered no authority establishing that the White 
House counsel is empowered to issue an amended order superseding the Executive Order signed by the 
President and now challenged by the States,” a “proposition [that] seems unlikely.” See Washington, 847 F.3d at 
1165. In light of the government’s changing interpretations of the order’s effect on LPRs, the court expressed 
skepticism that the Trump Administration would not revert back to denying entry to LPRs once again. See id. 
126  Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The second order removed Iraq 
from the list of affected countries, exempted lawful permanent residents from the travel ban and removed the 
indefinite ban on Syrian nationals. This order also eliminated language providing lower-level discretion to make 
exceptions to the refugee ban for foreign nationals of “minority” faiths in their home countries—an effort 
largely seen as attempting to give preference to Christian asylum-seekers. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 
F.3d 554, 633 (4th Cir. 2017).
127  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591-92. 
128  See id. at 592 (citing DHS report that the second iteration of the ban would not “diminish the 
threat of potential terrorist activity” as reason to find the government’s proffered purpose pretextual); see 
also id. at 572, 601 (noting that the Order “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination,” and 
“cannot be divorced from the cohesive narrative linking it to the animus that inspired it”).
129  At around the same time as the Fourth Circuit decision, a federal district court in Hawaii issued a 
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of certain sections of the second iteration of the travel ban. Hawaii 
v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017). The trial court was affirmed in large part by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 774, 779 (9th Cir. 2017). On a petition for a stay 
of the preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court did not directly address the Fourth or Ninth Circuit rulings 
that found the Government’s national security reasoning for EO-2 unconvincing, but it left the injunction 
in place with respect to those trying to enter the country who had a bona fide relationship with an entity or 
person in the United States. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017). The 
Court vacated its decision as moot once the second version of the travel ban expired based on its own terms. 
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
130  Proclamation 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (indefinitely restricting the entry of 
certain nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Kora, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen).
131  According to the government, DHS went through a detailed process in identifying which 
countries had information-sharing practices insufficient for the United States to vet foreign nationals entering 
the United States from those countries, identifying eight countries—Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 591 (D. Md. 
2017). The Acting Secretary of Homeland Security recommended entry restrictions on foreign nationals from 
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consultation with experts,132 a centerpiece of Chief Justice Roberts’s Trump v. Hawaii 
majority opinion that repeatedly touted good process133 as “a justification” for the entry 
ban that was “independent of unconstitutional grounds.”134 Although Roberts did not 
ignore the presence of the President’s patently biased statements,135 he recognized that, 
in addition to the Proclamation’s facial neutrality, it appeared to satisfy the judicial re-
quirement of a bona fide national security rationale promulgated through a careful and 
robust process.136 
B. Ex Ante and Ex Post Proceduralism
The discussion of small-p process, up until now, has focused on ex ante proceduralism. 
Ex ante procedures concern the quality of deliberation, involvement of experts, facilita-
tion of regular public hearings and open debate, documentation of studies, and other 
evidence that a given policy has been thoroughly vetted. Ex post procedures, by contrast, 
concern a coordinate institution’s ability to follow its own stated and published proce-
dures—including adherence to allowances, exceptions, and other promised mechanisms 
within the law itself. Both ex ante and ex post procedural review can turn on adherence 
to, or departures from, an expected norm or baseline akin to what Justice Powell de-
scribed in Arlington Heights.137 Moreover, it is not uncommon for courts to highlight 
each of those countries except Iraq. See id. Although Somalia’s practices were found sufficient, the Secretary 
still recommended entry restrictions for Somalian nationals as well. See id. Despite the DHS’s more tailored 
evaluation of the national security risk associated with nationals from each of the designated countries, “49 
former national security, foreign policy, and intelligence officials . . . state that ‘[a]s a national security measure,’ 
the Proclamation is ‘unnecessary’ and is of ‘unprecedented scope.’” Id. at 593. Further procedural problems 
with the Proclamation include that “concrete evidence” shows “country-based bans are ineffective,” the 
Proclamation fails to block nationals from certain countries with a non-Muslim majority that have “widely-
documented” information sharing deficiencies, no nationals from the designated countries have committed 
terrorist acts in the United States in the last 40 years, and no intelligence shows that nationals from the 
designated countries pose a terrorist threat to the United States. Id.
132  Brief for the Petitioners at 15, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Trump Travel Ban to Take Effect, N.Y. Times (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-supreme-court.html?_r=0. 
133  138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. By contrast, the lower 
courts continued to find contradictions in the agency review process as undermining the government’s 
national-security-based justifications. For example, a federal district court in Maryland concluded that the 
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a “misalignment between the stated national security goals of the ban and the 
means implemented to achieve them,” suggesting that the Government’s stated reason for the ban was not 
bona fide and not entitled to a presumption of deference. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 265 F. Supp. 3d 
at 618. The court rejected the government’s contention that the Proclamation was issued through the “routine 
operations of the government bureaucracy,” and concluded that not only did the government present such 
weak evidence to that end, but combined with public statements and historical events suggesting religious 
animosity, the plaintiffs would likely prevail on an establishment clause claim. Id. at 628. The court thus 
granted an injunction, barring enforcement of the travel ban only with respect to foreign nationals with a bona 
fide relationship with a person or organization in the Unites States. See id. at 631. However, the Supreme 
Court issued a stay of that order pending disposition of the government’s appeal. Soon afterward, the Supreme 
Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari following a Ninth Circuit affirmance of a Hawaii district 
court order enjoining enforcement of the Proclamation. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 542 
(2017).
134  Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. 
135  See id. at 2417-18 (contrasting the way some presidents “have used [their] power to espouse the 
principles of religious freedom and tolerance on which this Nation was founded,” while others “performed 
unevenly in living up to those inspiring words”).
136  See supra note 18.
137  See generally supra Part II.A (discussing Arlington Heights’ consideration of “departures from 
normal procedur[e]” as evincing intent).
50    |     FORDHAM LAW
both forms of procedural review as significant. In Fisher, for example, the Court not only 
detailed why adherence to ex ante procedure was significant to the school’s satisfaction 
of strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement but also instructed, in rather clear and 
unambiguous terms, a requirement that the university continue to make use of ex post 
procedures as a basis for the program’s continued validity and judicial endorsement.138 
While the Hawaii litigation provides an object lesson in the role that ex ante procedures 
play in shaping constitutional discourse and doctrinal arguments about governmental 
power, deference, and rights, the Court also made ex post procedure a pillar of its finding 
that the ban was based on a legitimate national security interest. In the wake of Hawaii, 
lower courts have paid special attention to the government’s adherence to its promised 
procedures. In that regard, Hawaii replicates a number of seminal post-9/11 Supreme 
Court decisions that focus on the Executive’s adherence to both ex ante and ex post 
procedure as a basis for judicial deference, or the lack thereof.139
1. Ex Ante and Ex Post Proceduralism in Hawaii
Chief Justice Roberts made it clear in Hawaii that the Proclamation could be vindicated 
based on the rigor of ex ante procedures—specifically, the “world-wide” and “multi-agen-
cy” review underlying the enactment.140 But Roberts also relied on the availability of 
ex post procedures—discretionary hardship waivers within the Proclamation—that 
further reinforced its “legitimate national security” foundations.141 Justice Breyer and 
Justice Sotomayor each wrote dissenting opinions linking ex post and ex ante process 
failure, respectively, with improper motivation.142 Breyer focused on ex post proce-
dures—namely the government’s actual implementation of the Proclamation’s waiver 
provisions. As he explained, the government’s adherence to its waiver process would be 
determinative as to whether “the Proclamation is a ‘Muslim ban,’ [or] a ‘security-based’ 
ban.”143 But ex post scrutiny indicated that the policy was predicated on invidious dis-
crimination given that, within the first month of the Proclamation, only two waivers 
were granted out of 6,555 eligible applicants.144 Breyer also noted the absence of other 
138  Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) (“Through regular evaluation 
of data and consideration of student experience, the University must tailor its approach in light of changing 
circumstances.”). 
139  See infra notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
140  Hawaii 138 S. Ct. at 2404, 2408.
141  Id. at 2422. Roberts also pointed to the “ongoing process” of reviewing entry restrictions for 
possible termination every 180 days, the “significant exceptions” and “carveouts” from the entry restrictions 
applicable to certain categories of foreign nationals, and the Proclamation’s direction to DHS and the State 
Department to issue guidance to consular officers regarding the criteria for hardship waivers. Id. at 2422-23.
142  Breyer drew an explicit connection between procedural regularity and improper motivation, 
noting that while “[m]embers of the Court principally disagree about . . . whether or the extent to which 
religious animus played a significant role in the Proclamation’s promulgation or content . . . the Proclamation’s 
elaborate system of exemptions and waivers can and should help us answer this question.” Id. at 2429 (Breyer, J. 
dissenting).
143  Id. at 2430 (“[I]f the Government is applying the exemption and waiver provisions as written, then 
its argument for the Proclamation’s lawfulness is strengthened. . . [But] if the Government is not applying the 
system of exemptions and waivers that the Proclamation contains, then its argument for the Proclamation’s 
lawfulness becomes significantly weaker.”). 
144  Id. at 2431. Breyer argued that, even as the number of granted waivers increased over time, it was 
still surprisingly low relative to the number of likely eligible individuals. Id.; see also id. at 2431-32 (noting 
the contrast between the Proclamation’s stated exemptions for those with significant business or professional 
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promised ex post procedures, including guidance to consular officers regarding the is-
suance of hardship waivers—still another reason to subject the Proclamation to more 
careful scrutiny.145 In contrast to Breyer’s focus on ex post mechanisms,146 Sotomayor ex-
pressed doubt regarding the veracity of the government’s ex ante procedures, including 
its professed “worldwide” review that consumed only 17 pages of published material.147 
For Sotomayor, the Court majority approached its ex ante in too thin a manner, permit-
ting “the President to hide behind an administrative review process that the Government 
refuses to disclose to the public.”148 
Ongoing challenges to the travel ban in the lower courts have invoked both ex ante and 
ex post procedural failure.149 One court in the District of Maryland permitted a case to 
move past the motion to dismiss stage when the plaintiffs showed how inconsistencies 
in the government’s selection of countries subject to the travel restrictions appeared to 
reflect discrepancies in the government’s own baseline criteria, undermining any “pre-
sumption of rationality” as a basis for deference.150 The trial court also noted substantial 
problems with the ban’s implementation, including the lack of any promised guidance 
on consular implementation of the waiver program, systematic denials of seemingly 
meritorious cases, statistics showing that only two percent of waiver applications had 
been granted as of April 2018, and claims by former consular officials that the waiver 
process was a “fraud.”151 Such indication of ex ante and ex post procedural failure sup-
ported an inference that the ban’s stated national security purpose was a mere “pretext 
for discrimination.”152 
obligations, close family ties in the U.S., asylum seekers, refugees and certain nonimmigrant visas and the 
minuscule number of waivers approved). For example, between December 8, 2017, and January 8, 2018, the 
State Department received almost 7,000 applications from visa-eligible nationals of listed countries. As of 
March 2018, waivers were granted to less than 1.5% of the otherwise visa-eligible and admissible applicants. 
Torbati & Rosenberg, Exclusive: Visa Waivers Rarely Granted Under Trump’s Latest U.S. Travel Ban: Data, 
Reuters (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-travelban-exclusive/exclusive-
visa-waivers-rarely-granted-under-trumps-latest-u-s-travel-ban-data-idUSKCN1GI2DW.
145  See Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2431 (Breyer, J. dissenting); id. at 2441 (Breyer, J. dissenting). Breyer also 
indicated that an ex post review could help determine whether the President had made the kind of “finding” 
contemplated by the statute on which it was based. See id. at 2430; see also 8 U. S. C. §1182(f ) (vesting the 
President with authority to restrict the entry of foreign nationals whom he “finds . . . would be detrimental to 
the interests of the United States”).
146  However, Breyer closed his dissent by also suggesting that an ex ante analysis would support setting 
aside the Proclamation as well. See Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2433 (noting, as a reason to set aside the Proclamation, 
“the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on a website taken down only after the President issued 
the two executive orders preceding the Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion”). 
147  See id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For Chief Justice Roberts, any quantitative floor would 
be arbitrary. Id. at 2421. A 17-page report could be highly substantive, with a reasoned basis in expert analysis 
and extensive supporting materials which simply were not accessible by FOIA request. Id. Thus, even if the 
policy was overbroad in its reach, as the dissent argued, because of the complexity and sensitivity involved in 
the national security context, the Court could not substitute its judgement and the executive was entitled to 
deference. Id.
148  Id. at 2443 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
149  See Robert L. Tsai, Trump’s Travel Ban Faces Fresh Legal Jeopardy, Politico (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/27/trump-travel-ban-lawsuit-supreme-court-
unconstitutional-226103.
150  Memorandum Opinion on Motion to Dismiss at 36-37, Int’l Refugee Assistant Project (IRAP) v. 
Trump, No. 17-cv-361 (D. Md. May 2, 2019) (ECF No. 276).
151  Id. at 37.
152  Id. Plaintiffs in the Northern District of California have also been allowed to proceed with a 
challenge under the APA, based on established doctrine that administrative agencies are bound to follow their 
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In short, even as the Trump Administration claims victory in Hawaii, ongoing failures 
regarding the very procedures that induced judicial deference in the Supreme Court 
may render the policy open to ongoing attack. In that regard, Justice Breyer’s Hawaii 
dissent that any sham waiver program could render the ban unconstitutional remains a 
basis for renewed litigation, potentially placing the policy in jeopardy.153 
2. The Executive and Ex Ante/Ex Post Procedure 
Hawaii was not the first time that ex ante or ex post procedural review has figured into 
major Supreme Court rulings of presidential action. Many of the post-9/11 decisions 
involving the “war on terror” have been described as largely procedural in nature.154 As 
a prominent example, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld155 invoked both ex ante and ex post process 
scrutiny to rule on the legality of military commissions at Guantanamo Bay. In terms 
of its actual holding, the Court applied ex post proceduralism, rejecting the President’s 
commissions for failure to adhere to a requirement under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice mandating that commissions follow an “impracticability” finding related to 
the use of courts martial.156 Shortly after the decision, Professor Neal Katyal observed 
how ex ante procedure—specifically the lack of deliberation and inter-agency dialogue 
within the George W. Bush Administration—doomed its post-9/11 policies regarding 
the detention and trial of terror suspects in the courts: “Through bypassing the inter-
agency process, and squelching expertise under the aegis of political accountability, the 
Administration weakened the rationale for deference all on its own.”157 On this view, 
the commissions in Hamdan were especially prone to judicial defeat because they lacked 
buy-in from the Executive Branch’s own experts.158
As another prominent example of ex post process scrutiny in the executive context, the 
own rules and guidelines. Order re Motion to Dismiss at Emami v. Nielson, No. 18-cv-1587 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
4, 2019) (ECF No. 74). Ex post procedural failures, in particular the “blanket denials” of waiver applications, 
played a key role in the court’s rationale for denying the motion to dismiss. Id. at 15-16.
153  See Tsai, supra note 156. 
154  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An 
Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 352, 395 (2010) (observing that “the Court’s War on 
Terror habeas decisions manifest a far greater willingness to rule for petitioners on grounds of procedure than 
of substance”); Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 235, 244 
(2006) (observing that Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004) “conceives of 
procedure as an instrument to arrive at correct decisions”); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between 
Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process approach to Rights During 
Wartime, 5 Theoretical Inquiries L. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that courts have resolved cases pitting individual 
liberty against national security through the lens of procedural rather than substantive questions); Joseph 
Landau, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 Wash. L. Rev. 661, 
666 (2009) (“[C]ourts have [] put procedure to muscular uses—focusing on the means of coordinate branch 
decision-making, while still allowing the political branches to define the content of the substantive law.”); Jenny 
S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1013, 1013 (2008) (observing 
that “most of the court decisions in cases challenging” policies enacted during the war on terror “have not 
directly addressed substantive rights claims” but rather “have almost all been about process.”).
155  548 U.S. 557 (2006).
156  Id. at 623.
157  See Neal Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 65, 
71 (2006); see also id. at 109-12.
158  Id. at 71 (arguing that Hamdan “second-guessed the President’s interpretations perhaps because 
those interpretations had not earned the approval of the bureaucracy, including the Judge Advocates General 
and the State Department.”).
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D.C. Circuit in Bismullah v. Gates placed onerous demands on the government regard-
ing discovery obligations for Guantanamo detainee cases.159 In Bismullah, the court 
essentially required the government to restart the entire evidence-gathering process 
with respect to each and every detainee after it became apparent that the government 
had failed to follow its own vetting mechanisms around detention determinations.160 
While the Court had endorsed the proposition in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that “fair pro-
cess can be provided by nonjudicial decisionmakers,”161 detainees were often victorious 
in court when noting the government’s failure to follow its own procedures. Indeed, 
similar lapses in ex post procedure arguably influenced the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Boumediene v. Bush to consider the applicability of the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause at Guantanamo Bay and invalidate the political branches’ alternate review sys-
tem.162 To understand why Boumediene provides an object lesson in ex post procedure, 
one need only recall that the Supreme Court had initially denied certiorari in April 2017, 
only to reverse itself less than three months later, after the parties moved for rehearing 
and provided declarations attesting to the executive branch’s inadequate implementa-
tion of its own standards and procedures.163 
C. Process Scrutiny in Hindsight: The Case of Korematsu
Putting aside the contemporary litigation, there is value to reflecting on process scrutiny 
retrospectively. Consider, for example, its effect on Korematsu v. United States, a deci-
sion upholding an executive order authorizing the exclusion of Japanese-Americans164 
and a low-point in American constitutional history.165 Korematsu features two prom-
inent theories of judicial review, neither of which mitigated the tragic outcome. First, 
Korematsu is the Court’s first invocation of the “strict scrutiny” standard.166 Even as 
159  501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Decl. of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy ¶¶ 4–6, 10–13 (May 31, 2007) (noting, 
inter alia, that tribunals were unable to verify that they had examined all the relevant, available information; 
agencies routinely denied requests for confirmation by Guantánamo personnel that the agency had no 
exculpatory information on a particular detainee; and exculpatory evidence was withheld from tribunals if it 
was believed to be ‘duplicative’ or ‘not relat[ing] to a specific allegation being made against the detainee’).
160  Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 180 (2007). Declarations and empirical data undermined the 
presumption that the government had followed its own procedures, and as a result of these lapses the litigation 
became more focused on the agency’s compliance with process. See Decl. of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant 
Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, ¶¶ 5-24, Bismullah, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 2007) (No. 06-1197) 
(disclosing failures in the evidence-gathering process and a failure to adhere to the government’s procedures); 
Decl. of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy, ¶¶ 4-6, 10-13, Bismullah, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. 
Cir. May 31, 2007) (No. 06-1197) (same).
161  Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1533, 
1613 (2007).
162  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
163  Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S 1328 (2007) (mem.), vacated, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007) (mem.). See 
also Landau, supra note 161, at 694. 
164  During World War II, a presidential executive order authorized the military to issue exclusion 
orders against persons of Japanese ancestry residing in certain areas on the West Coast. The Supreme Court 
affirmed Korematsu’s conviction for defying the order. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), 
abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
165  Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 631 n.4 (14th ed. 2001) 
(“Korematsu is a case that has come to live in infamy.”); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 
379 (2011) (identifying Korematsu among “the Supreme Court’s worst decisions”). See Issacharoff & Pildes, 
supra note 161, at 18-19 (“Korematsu is excoriated as one of the two or three worst moments in American 
constitutional history.”). See also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (overruling Korematsu). 
166  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
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the Court announced the rule that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights 
of a single racial group are immediately suspect,”167 it failed to give those words sub-
stance. The military’s justifications for targeting Japanese persons are recognized today 
as having reflected “race prejudice [and] war hysteria” rather than fact;168 indeed, this 
is readily apparent from their cursory examination.169 While the Court paid lip service 
to a heightened standard of review, its deference to the government was near-absolute, 
as it unquestionably accepted the military’s prejudicial and conclusory justifications.170 
As a related matter, Korematsu demonstrates the pitfalls of “bilateral endorsement” the-
ory.171 The theory, commonly attributed to Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence 
eight years after Korematsu, holds that judicial review should be extremely deferential 
when the coordinate branches agree on policy.172 In the parlance of Justice Jackson, a 
president acting with congressional backing does so at the height of her powers—as 
arguably was the case in Korematsu.173 Strict scrutiny doctrine, still in infancy, failed 
to spur even a mildly searching review of evidence that should have been heavily scru-
tinized and invalidated. To the extent that bilateral endorsement serves only to affirm 
government decisions in such situations,174 the question then becomes: What gaps 
might process scrutiny have filled?
Concededly, it is counterintuitive to envision that a framework analyzing “departures 
from normal procedure” can help tackle actions taken during the abnormal times of 
war. Nevertheless, in his dissent, Justice Murphy describes a baseline of procedure he 
considered consistent and appropriate for the circumstances, drawing on the more pro-
cedurally robust treatment of citizens of German or Italian ancestry.175 Murphy believed 
that, given the constitutional issues at stake, “normal procedure” would have entailed 
“hold[ing] loyalty hearings for the . . . persons involved” rather than relying on govern-
ment say-so.176 Further, he questioned the type of evidence advanced by the military as 
atypical of what a more procedurally sound process would have produced.177
Naturally, the classification against the Japanese in Korematsu was overt. Indeed, the 
2392 (2018).
167  Id.
168  United States, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians, 18 (1983), https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/justice-denied.
169  See Korematsu 323 U.S. at 235-36 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (finding the exclusion of Japanese-
Americans to be based on an “erroneous assumption of racial guilt rather than bona fide military necessity” and 
utterly lacking in “reliable evidence”).
170  See id. at 217-18.
171  The term “bilateral endorsement” was dubbed by Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 161.
172  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) ( Jackson, J., concurring).
173  See Korematsu 323 U.S. at 216-17. 
174  Cf. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 161, at 19 (“The risk of an entire nation, and its elected 
representatives, succumbing to wartime hysteria is ever present.”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets 
Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants,” 68 
Ala. L. Rev. 1127, 1135 (2005) (bilateral endorsement “runs the risk of inviting Congress and the executive to 
collude in the violation of individual rights”).
175  Korematsu 323 U.S. at 241-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
176  See id. at 242.
177  See id. at 236-37 (“Justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable 
racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment.”).
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majority recognized as much by invoking strict scrutiny—at least on paper. However, 
insofar as criticism of the decision has focused on the Court’s turning a blind eye to the 
military’s invidious intent, a greater adherence to small-p process, emphasizing the lack 
of evidentiary procedural rigor, may well have shone a brighter light on the invidious 
nature of the government’s action, perhaps tilting the balance towards a less egregious 
outcome. At a minimum, Korematsu also showcases a patently weak application of strict 
scrutiny theory in which an additional layer of process scrutiny (given the defects that ex-
isted in Fred Korematsu’s case) was much needed in the heavily deferential environment.
More generally, the theory of bilateral endorsement can be placed in new perspective 
when viewed through the lens of process scrutiny. Periods when the legislative-execu-
tive dynamism needed for effective interbranch oversight (or bilateral endorsement) is 
absent could feature identifiable defects in small-p process.178 Moreover, as a procedur-
al theory of review itself, bilateral endorsement, at its best, inherently invites process 
scrutiny because the executive’s correct application of the legislative mandate will often 
entail correct application of mandated procedure. For instance, in Korematsu, the co-
ordinate branches’ collusion to repress the rights of Japanese citizens was marked by a 
weak procedural effort and production of evidence.179 A greater focus on or adherence 
to small-p process scrutiny as a natural extension of the process-oriented review courts 
have since applied may well have curbed the Court’s ill-fated, near-absolute deference to 
the executive. 
178  Such a problem seemed to define many of the war-on-terror policies initiated after the 9/11 
attacks, as Congress remained largely passive throughout that tumultuous time. As Katyal explains, Congress 
“did not affirm or regulate President Bush’s decision to use military commissions to try unlawful belligerents. 
It stood silent when President Bush accepted thinly reasoned legal views of the Geneva Conventions.” Neal 
Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 
Yale L.J. 2314, 2319 (2006). Unchecked by the legislature, the executive flaunted procedure in its pursuit 
of individuals it saw as combatants in the war on terror—even ignoring its own procedural standards. See 
Landau, supra note 161, at 693-94. The Court wound up resolving a host of post-9/11 cases through the lens 
of procedural regularity, holding the executive accountable based on failures within its underlying vetting 
mechanisms or when it failed to adhere to its own procedural standards. See id. at 689-96. 
179  See Korematsu 323 U.S. at 236-67; id. at 241-42.
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n current debates about race and 
inequality in the United States, we tend 
to forget a key institution: the family.
Robin A. Lenhardt’s research focuses 
critical attention on the role family law 
systems and structures have long played 
in shaping racial subordination and 
disadvantage in the United States. 
Lenhardt thus provides invaluable  
insights into the kinds of solutions that  
can be deployed to interrupt processes  
that “lock” families of color and their 
members into persistent inequality.
I
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Robin A. Lenhardt
Professor of Law 
 hitewashing the Family, to be published by the Wisconsin Law Review,  
builds on this foundation by offering an alternative, race-informed account 
of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a U.S. Supreme Court precedent not 
typically associated with race. Professor Lenhardt draws on what is arguably the most 
comprehensive case file on Moore outside that developed by the lawyers in the case. 
She offers a vivid retelling of the case that situates the travails of plaintiff Inez Moore—
an African American grandmother who risked jail to challenge a zoning ordinance 
criminalizing extended families like her own—within the racial context of 1960s and 70s 
America. In so doing, Professor Lenhardt provides readers both with a window onto the 
case and the race effects of Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court, which, in invalidating 
East Cleveland’s ordinance, has become an essential part of the family law canon. In 
particular, her intervention uncovers:
• Moore’s doctrinal role in divorcing race from family in the Court’s jurisprudence;
• Archival documents highlighting Justice Powell and others’ unwillingness to 
recognize the operation of race in Moore and to solidify color-blindness as a norm;
• Moore’s significant influence on the evolution of the modern Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence, as evidenced in decisions such as University of California v. 
Bakke;
• The extent to which the concepts of “liberty” and “family” deployed in Moore not 
only assume family internalization of need, but—insofar as they speak to the impact 
of so-called “societal discrimination” on caregiving units—also suggest that already 
disproportionately disadvantaged families of color must ultimately bear that burden.
Importantly, the insights Whitewashing the Family offer are not merely doctrinal. 
Professor Lenhardt’s contribution, which is part of a larger book project, also:
• Links Moore to the absence of sustained references to the family in public discourse 
on racial inequality today;
• Highlights how Moore and other family precedents contribute to distorting 
understanding of the very existence of racial inequality and its operation; 
• Helps to identify the intersecting systems and structures that tether families of color 
to inequality; and
• Functions to map the contours of new and much needed solutions.
With a dynamic approach that puts race front and center and privileges the experiences 
of African Americans and other groups “on the ground,” Professor Lenhardt’s work 
opens the door to a better understanding of and responses to racial inequality and the 
devastating impact it has on families in the United States. 
W




“Why do they want to break up my family? 
… These children need love like all children 
do, that’s what I supply. I’m doing what any 
grandmother would do.”1
   —Inez Moore
 
On May 17, 1974, Inez Moore, a widowed grandmother of little means, was found 
criminally liable of violating a City of East Cleveland, Ohio, ordinance.2 Following 
municipal court proceedings, she was fined twenty-five dollars and sentenced to five 
days in jail.3 Inez Moore’s crime notably involved none of the behavior one might 
expect to result in criminal punishment. She had not stolen, disrupted, or lied. 
Nor had she injured another person or their property.4 At the end of the day, her 
offense was one grandparents across the country arguably commit every day: loving 
a grandchild.5
One of the key features of East Cleveland’s complex municipal code was that it 
precluded more than one dependent adult of the nominal head of the household 
from residing there with a child or another adult dependent. In effect, it criminalized 
certain extended household configurations.6 Unbeknownst to Inez, she ran afoul of 
those provisions when she moved into her new home at 1854 Garfield Road in that 
bedroom suburb of Cleveland. The duplex was meant to house Inez’s grown daughter, 
Carol, and her son on one side.7 On the other, Inez would reside with several other 
family members.8 Those inhabitants included her adult son Dale Sr., his son, Dale Jr., 
her grandson, John Jr., and occasionally that child’s father, John Sr., another of Inez’s 
adult children.9 In time, however, one of the City’s municipal inspectors, a Mr.
1 Richard Carnell, Grandmother Fights for Privacy, Wis. St. J. May 15, 1977.
2 See City of East Cleveland v. Inez Moore, No. 162307 (East Cleveland Mun. Ct., May 17. 1974). 
3 Brief and Assignment of Error for Appellant, at 2, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 
(1977) (No. 75-6289), 1976 WL 178725, at * 2 Court of Appeals, Eighth Appellate Dist., Ohio. 
4 See id.
5 Richard Carnell, Grandmother Fights for Privacy, Wis. St. J. May 15, 1977. 
6 R.A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Foreword: Moore Kinship, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 2551, 2552 
(2017).
7  Peggy Cooper Davis, Moore v. East Cleveland: Constructing the Suburban Family, in Family Law 
Stories 77, 80 (Carol Sanger, e.d., 2008). 
8  Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977).
9 Id. at n.4. John Jr. was apparently an intermittent inhabitant of Inez’s home, See id.
Whitewashing the Family
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Raiford G. Williams, would disrupt this plan for family unification.10
On January 16, 1973, Inspector Williams delivered the first of three “Notice of 
Violation of Ordinance[s]” informing Mrs. Moore that, under municipal law, her 
seven-year old grandson John, was “an illegal occupant of suite 1854.”11 With the 
service of each such notice, city officials advised that Mrs. Moore bring her residence 
into compliance by simply sending John Jr.—a child whom Inez had cared for since 
1968, when he was an infant and his mother died unexpectedly—to live elsewhere.12 
Each time Inez refused. For her, the importance of family was too great to permit 
a mere zoning ordinance to interfere with the familial ties that she had nurtured in 
building a familial unit that included seven adult children and a total of twenty-two 
grandchildren.13 She would later explain her determination not to yield to the city’s 
dictates in these terms: “Throughout the United States ever since I was born, everyone 
has talked about the family living together, staying together, and praying together, and 
that’s what I’m trying to do.”14 
The battle Inez Moore waged to ensure that her grandson could continue to reside 
with her, with the only mother he had ever truly known, would ultimately be 
fought in three state courts and eventually the United States Supreme Court, which 
embraced a version of Inez’s own attitudes about family almost exactly three years 
after her conviction was certified.15 In the years hence, Justice Powell’s plurality 
opinion in Moore—which in invalidating East Cleveland’s zoning law, held that the 
East Cleveland ordinance simply “slice[d] too deeply into the family itself ””16—has 
become an essential precedent in the family law canon.17 The case marks the Court’s 
modern embrace of substantive Due Process in the family relations realm.18 And it often 
gets cited for its recognition of the place of non-nuclear families in the constitutional 
scheme.19 Very few would associate Moore with race, as the primary opinion makes 
no mention of that subject at all.20 However, in ways too often overlooked, Moore 
10 See Brief and Assignment of Error for Appellant, Court of Appeals, Eighth Appellate Dist., Ohio,  
at 2.
11 Id.
12 Moore, 431 U.S. at 496. Mrs. Moore, in many ways, was much more than a grandmother to both of 
her grandsons. Indeed, she was an integral part of their development, “shar[ing] parental responsibilities with 
[both of ] their fathers.” See Phil Wieland, Court Win Pleases This Grandmother, Plain Dealer, June 1, 1977; see 
also Davis, supra note 7, at 78. 
13 Thomas J. Quinn, Zoning No; Family Yes: Court Strikes Down E. Cleveland Curb, Plain Dealer, 
June 1, 1977.
14 Grandmother Asks Top Court to Keep Her Family Together, Plain Dealer, Apr. 27, 1976. While 
fealty to family obviously drove Inez’s actions in Moore, it bears noting that child welfare alternatives for 
African-American children in the Cleveland area were especially poor during this time. See Marian J. Morton, 
Institutionalizing Inequality: Black Children and Child Welfare in Cleveland, 1859-1998, 34 J. of Soc. Hist. 141 
(2000).
15 Moore, 431 U.S. at 498 (drawing distinction between zoning provisions regulating related and 
unrelated persons in plurality decision overturning Moore’s conviction). 
16 Id.
17 See Lenhardt & Huntington, supra note 6, at 2552.
18 See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329 (1979) (discussing, 
inter alia, Supreme Court decisions concerning personal autonomy and familial rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
19 See Lenhardt & Huntington, supra note 6.
20 For important exceptions, see, e.g., Lenhardt & Huntington, supra note 6, ; Angela Onwuachi-
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deserves recognition not just as a race-related case, but as one of the Court’s most 
consequential decisions on race and inequality.
This Article tells the true story of Moore and its doctrinal role in whitewashing the 
institution of the family, in divorcing notions of family from those of race. It contends 
that, rather than natural or commonsensical, this separation reflects a concerted effort 
on the part of Justice Powell and others actively to preclude discussion of race in a 
kinship case where it was plainly a factor, leaving future generations with a white-
washed narrative that tells only part of the story. Drawing on what I believe is the most 
comprehensive case file on Moore outside of that developed by the lawyers in the case, 
it reveals that the Court’s decision played a unique role in importing into family law 
a colorblind norm most often thought to characterize modern race jurisprudence21 
and helped to solidify the Court’s overall blindness to the cumulative racial effects 
of so-called “societal discrimination” in the United States.22 In doing so, the essay 
explicates Moore’s role in removing the family as a useful unit of analysis of persistent 
inequality and disadvantage in the race context. This loss is borne out in the absence 
of sustained references to the family in public discourse on racial inequality today. 
The Essay thus argues that the deleterious effects of the Moore decision are not solely 
doctrinal. It makes it plain that, ultimately, Moore has served to distort and undermine 
understanding of the very existence of racial inequality and its operation in society. 
To this extent, the intervention made in the pages that follow goes well beyond Moore 
itself. Ultimately, it concerns how we understand race, family, and equality today.
*       *      *
II. 
Moore v. As a family Appeal for (Racial) Justice
 
“[East Cleveland’s] housing ordinance and 
some other laws were designed to keep black 
people out of certain residential areas.”23 
   —Inez Moore
Standard accounts of Moore begin and end with the legal questions of family structure 
and choice it presented.24 Certainly, the importance of such issues in the case, not 
to mention both family and constitutional law, cannot be gainsaid.25 In many ways, 
Willig, Extending the Normativity of the Extended Family: Reflections on Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 85 
Fordham L. Rev. 2655 (2017); Davis, supra note 7.
21 For an important discussion of colorblindness and equal protection doctrine, see, e.g., Osagie 
Obasagie, Blinded by Sight: Seeing Race Through the Eyes of the Blind (2013).
22 For a discussion of structural inequality and societal discrimination in equal protection doctrine, 
see R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 Hastings L. J. 1527 (2910). 
23 Grandmother Asks Top Court to Keep Her Family Together, Plain Dealer, Apr. 28, 1976.
24 Lenhardt & Huntington supra note 6, at 2552. 
25 Id.
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however, they represent only the tip of the iceberg where that decision is concerned. 
Properly understood, the battle that Inez Moore waged against the City of East 
Cleveland was one for racial justice and inclusion, not just the right of familial 
choice.26 For her, the two were inextricably bound. Understanding this and what her 
case truly involved requires an inquiry into the issues of race, class, and segregation 
that provided the backdrop against which the story of this doctrinally significant 
litigation played out.27 
The zoning provision at the center of the Moore litigation, while perhaps more 
intricate than most, was fairly representative of ordinances adopted by predominantly 
white municipalities amidst the Great Migration and its aftermath. This wave of 
African-American migration from roughly 1916 to 196028—attracting Inez Moore 
and millions of others from the Jim Crow South to northern cities in search of equal 
treatment and better economic prospects—led Whites to find refuge in suburban 
enclaves directly subsidized by the federal government.29 It also spurred them to 
reinforce this exclusivity with ordinances that only accelerated the racial segregation 
of urban and suburban spaces.30 
*       *      *
Few metropolitan areas document this as comprehensively as that encompassing 
Cleveland, Ohio, a popular destination for black migrants and one of the most racially 
segregated areas in the country...31 During this time, black migrants there “faced 
tremendous obstacles once they arrived in the promised land.”32 This was especially 
true in the area of housing.33 
*       *      *
On July 18, 1966, black Cleveland residents voiced their dissent by taking to the 
streets in the predominantly black Hough area, the poorest and most under-resourced 
ward in the city.34 Four days later, after police and National Guard actions that only 
intensified the unrest, four black deaths, including those of two children; hundreds of 
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1161, 
11208-10 (2008) (discussing black migration from the South). 
29 See Andrew H. Whittemore, The Experience of Racial and Ethnic Minorities with Zoning in the 
United States, 32 J. of Plan. Literature 16, 16 (2017).
30 Id. at 17. 
31 See Townsand Price-Spratlen & Avery M. Guest, Race and Population Change: A Longitudinal 
Look at Cleveland Neighborhoods, 17 Soc. Forum 105, 114 (2002) (noting “Cleveland was second only to 
Chicago in levels of segregation among the 50 largest metropolitan areas”). These housing issues affected 
both private and public housing options for African Americans in Cleveland. See, e.g., Todd M. Michney, 
Constrained Communities: Black Cleveland’s Experience with World War II Public Housing, 40 J. of Soc. Hist. 
933 (2007).
32 Leonard N. Moore, Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black Political Power 2 (2002).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 47-49.
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police and civilian injuries; and many millions in property damages were recorded.35 
Thus far, no research suggests that Inez was directly affected by this rebellion,36which, 
like an even larger eruption of black Clevelander concerns and violence in 1968, 
garnered the attention of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and mention in the 
Kerner Commission’s Report on Civil Disorders, which famously concluded in its 
report, released fifty years ago this past year, that “[o]ur country is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”37 At the same time, it clearly 
had other unexpected consequences important to understanding how Inez herself 
ultimately came to live in neighboring East Cleveland and the series of events that 
resulted in the Supreme Court judgment in her favor.38
Incorporated in 1911, the City of East Cleveland began as a haven for middle and 
upper-class white homeowners.39 The site of General Electric’s famed Nela Park—the 
country’s first industrial commons—it became so popular that, by 1920, it had had 
doubled in size and attracted a solid economic base.40 By 1966, when violence broke 
out in neighboring Cleveland’s Hough area, however, East Cleveland found itself in 
the midst of “tremendous racial change.”41 
*       *      *
White flight took root in East Cleveland in earnest as black newcomers like Inez 
arrived and white former residents continued to move elsewhere. . . .42 To put the 
impact of such a demographic shift on East Cleveland in sharp relief, “[i]n 1960 only 
2.4% of East Cleveland’s [roughly 40,000] residents” were African American. Less 
than ten years later, “that figure had reached more than 40%” and showed no signs of 
abatement.43 This racial context stayed in place and even worsened as the Moore case 
unfolded.44
In the early and mid-1960s, white leaders in East Cleveland took the position that “any 
attempt by the city to block black entry would be morally wrong.”45 So, unlike other 
jurisdictions, East Cleveland did not look actively to disrupt black in-migration . . . . 
Still, resident whites as well as middle-class blacks feared that “East Cleveland would 
become a ghetto, indistinguishable from the black and increasingly lower-class ghetto 
35 Id. at 48.
36 A second major altercation between African-American residents of Cleveland and the police 
occurred on July 23, 1968, in the Glenville area located in the eastern part of the jurisdiction. See Arthur D. 
Little, East Cleveland: Response to Urban Change 7 (1969) (hereinafter “Response to Urban Change”).
37 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968).
38 See Leonard N. Moore, Carl B. Stokes and the Rise of Black Political Power 44 (2003) (discussing 
Civil Rights Commission hearings on Cleveland). A similar outbreak of rioting occurred in 1968 during the 
tenure of Mayor Carl Stokes, the first African American to serve as mayor of a major United States city. Id. 
39 Davis, supra note 7, at 79.
40 Id.
41 Leah Santosusso, East Cleveland (Images of America) 9 (2013).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 7.
44 Today, East Cleveland is more than 95% African American. [cite] Its economic fortunes have only 
grown more dire. Officials recently filed for bankruptcy on the city’s behalf. [cite]
45 See Keating, The Suburban Racial Dilemma: Housing and Neighborhoods 54–61 (1994).
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across its western border.”46 City leaders thus decided to trade on their reputation for 
“good government”47 and regulation, especially in zoning, a tool widely used, as noted 
earlier, to “exclud[e] . . . racial or economic” minorities.48 In particular, they pledged 
to “strengthe[n] municipal services” and ensure “strict enforcement of housing codes” 
and other similar provisions.49 This commitment—which was later taken up by 
the predominantly African-American City Commission in place during the Moore 
litigation—included not only enforcing existing rules, but apparently also creating or 
modifying new provisions where necessary.
Inez’s initial contact with East Cleveland’s enforcement mechanisms arose not in 
zoning, but in the education context, after John, Jr. was temporarily precluded from 
attending his local elementary school. It was only later, after Inez, with the help of 
Cleveland Legal Aid lawyers, initiated a class action prompting changes in school 
admission policy that zoning became a concern. School administrators reported 
Moore to zoning officials for noncompliance with a code provision “limit[ing] 
occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family.” In the process, they 
revealed the mutually reinforcing, trans-substantive, “adaptive” nature of the city’s 
effective governance mechanism,50 as well as the strength of several major concerns 
held by municipal leaders: “family instability,” 51 school overcrowding;52 “border 
jumping,”53 “violence.”54
Like many jurisdictions, East Cleveland “limit[ed] occupancy of a dwelling unit to 
members of a single family” under Section 1351.02 of its municipal code.55 However, 
Section 1341.08, the provision Inez was ultimately charged with violating, established 
what constituted “family” for zoning purposes. 56 In many ways, the “unusual and 
46 Id.
47 Response to Urban Change, supra note 36, at 3.
48 Id.
49 Id at 3.
50 See Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1235 (2016) (discussing systems 
theory and ways in which racial discrimination changes adapts over time).
51 Davis, supra note 7.
52 See U.S. Supreme Court Brief for the Appellant, at p. 51.
53 Phil Wieland, Court Win Pleases This Grandmother, Plain Dealer, June 1, 1977.
54 Davis, supra note 7.
55 Moore, 431 U.S. at 496.
56 Id. Section 1341.08 provided in relevant part that:  
‘Family’ means a number of individuals related to the nominal head of the household or to the 
spouse of the nominal head of the household living as a single housekeeping unit in single dwelling 
unit, but limited to the following:
 (a) husband or wife of the nominal head of household.
 (b) unmarried children of the nominal head of household or of the spouse of the 
nominal head of household, provided, however, that such unmarried children have no 
children residing with them.
 (c ) father or mother of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the 
nominal head of household.
 (d) notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (b) hereof, a family may include 
not more than one dependent married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the 
household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household and the spouse and 
dependent children of such dependent child. For the purpose of this subsection, a 
dependent person is one who has more than fifty percent of his total support furnished 
for him by the nominal head of the household and the spouse of the nominal head of 
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complicated definitional section” it offered mirrored the nuanced position town 
officials tried to carve out for themselves on racial issues.57 On one hand, officials 
wanted to be inclusive, declining, for example, to limit qualifying familial units to 
traditional nuclear families. . . . At the same time, they were clear in their intent to 
exclude certain families from their community. Section 1341.08—by precluding 
more than one dependent adult of the nominal head of a household to reside there 
with a child or another adult dependent—excluded Inez’s household. It was seemingly 
designed to stop short of including all families, perhaps especially those extended 
African-American families headed by black women. 58 The 1965 publication of the 
Moynihan Report very negatively affected how such familial units were regarded 
across the country, describing them as “a tangle of pathology”59 whose “anti-social” 
proclivities “retard[ed] the progress of [African Americans] as a whole.”60 And East 
Cleveland officials, first whites and then increasingly African Americans, seemed 
largely to have embraced this view of many of the black families moving into its 
borders.61 Indeed, “Response to Urban Change specifically referred “family instability” 
as “a characteristic of black urban ghettos” that East Cleveland could and should 
avoid.”62 
On its face, Section 1341.08 made no mention whatsoever of this context or the 
possible race-related concerns animating East Cleveland’s zoning rules. To get any 
further insight into that one would have to consider the history, legislative and 
otherwise, of that provision and its adoption. Significantly, that history reveals that 
the precursor to Section 1341.08, Section 1.014, was enacted in 1953.63 Notably, 
it deployed a definition of “family” different from that which ensnared the Moore 
family:
“any number of individuals related to the 
nominal head of the household as husband or 
wife, son or daughter, father or mother, sister 
or brother, or their spouses and dependent 
children living together as a single housekeeping 
unit and having facilities for cooking and 
sleeping in that part of the premises occupied 
by it. A ‘family’ may consist of one individual.64  
the household.
 (e)  a family may consist of one individual.
57 See Part I of the full article.
58 Stereotypes of black women as “welfare queens” and other undesirables proliferated during this 
period. See Black Citizenship Through Marriage, 66 Hastings L.J. 1317, 1341-34 (2015). 
59 Id. 
60 Davis, supra note 7.
61 Id.
62 Id. (quoting Response to Urban Change).
63 See Ord. No. 476; Nov. 17, 1953.
64 Id. 
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The language incorporated in Section 1.014 was more capacious and defined family 
much more expansively. In short, it allowed for much greater diversity in family 
structure and form than Section 1341.08.65 
The shift to the ordinance language at issue in Moore was effectuated in 1966, a 
mere eight days after the earlier discussed Hough riots.66 Emotions at the time ran 
high for those black Clevelanders suffering from poor living conditions and lack of 
opportunity,67 but also for residents and officials in the jurisdictions that surrounded 
or, as in East Cleveland’s case, abutted Cleveland.68 The modification in zoning 
language so close in time to the riots plainly served an expressive purpose, setting the 
terms on which inclusion in the community could be won. It also performed a racial 
gatekeeping function, insofar as it provided a mechanism legally to exclude black 
housekeeping units from Cleveland farthest away in structure and operation from 
the nuclear family ideal prized by East Cleveland and other suburban jurisdictions. 
Inez Moore herself clearly understood this reality, explaining during one of the 
many interviews that she gave over the course of her case, that Section 1341.08 was 





69 Grandmother Asks Top Court to Keep Her Family Together, Plain Dealer, Apr. 27 (1976).
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[with Sebastian Zimmeck, Peter Story, Daniel 
Smullen, Abhilasha Ravichander, Ziqi Wang, 
N. Cameron Russell & Norman Sadeh].
“Challenges in Automated Question 
Answering for Privacy Policies,” AAAI Spring 
Symposium on Privacy Enhancing AI and 
Language Technologies (2019) [with Abhilasha 
Ravichander, Alan Black, Eduard Hovy, Joel 
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Law School, 2000; Ph.D., Princeton University, 
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“Deconstitutionalizing Dewey,” 13 Florida 
International University Law Review 765-800 
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Book Chapters & Other Writings:
“Homeschooling, Virtual Schools, and the 
Erosion of the Public/Private Binary” in 
Homeschooling in the 21st Century: Research and 
Prospects (Robert Maranto & Debra A. Bell, 
eds., New York: Routledge, 2018) (reprinting 10 
Journal of School Choice 297 (2016)).
“The Tactics of Title IX.” Review of The 
Transformation of Title IX: Regulating Gender 
Equality in Education by R. Shep Melnick, 
13 Journal of School Choice 438-441 (2019) 
(forthcoming).
BETH SCHWARTZ
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B.A., Phi Beta Kappa, SUNY (Buffalo), 1973; 
J.D., St. John’s University Law School, 1978
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A Teacher’s Manual to Lawyers as Counselors: 
A Client-Centered Approach, 4th ed. St. Paul, 
MN: West Academic Publishing, 2019 [with 
David A. Binder, Paul B. Bergman, Paul R. 
Tremblay & Ian S. Weinstein].
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School, 2002; Ph.D., Yale University, 2008
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Questions: A Cautionary Tale,” 45 Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 651-670 (2018) 
[with Gautham Rao].
“Faithful Execution and Article II,” 132 
Harvard Law Review 2111-2192 (2019) [with 
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“Fiduciary Constitutionalism: Implications 
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463-489 (2019) [with Ethan J. Leib].
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Attorney General as a Case for Structural 
Independence,” 87 Fordham Law Review 1965-
1994 (2019).
Book Chapters & Other Writings:
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University, 1999; J.D., Duke Law School, 1999
Books:
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from Big Ag, Big Tech, and Big Money. New 
York: St. Martin’s Publishing Group, 2020 
(forthcoming).
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Corruption,” 147 Daedalus 111-126 (2018).
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1991
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“From Riggs v. Palmer to Shelley v. Kraemer: 
the Continuing Significance of the Law-Equity 
Distinction” in Philosophical Foundations 
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